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The arm-of-the-state doctrine, which entitles certain governmental entities to
the states’ sovereign immunity, is an embodiment of American federalism. In theory,
this doctrine ensures that federal courts appreciate the concerns for state sovereignty
and solvency that motivated the passage of the Eleventh Amendment. However, a
combination of factors—the Supreme Court’s sparse guidance, the growth and diffusion of power across local, state, and federal governments, and the availability of
other immunity doctrines—has rendered the arm-of-the-state doctrine an incomprehensible anachronism. Most courts determine whether an entity defendant receives
arm-of-the-state immunity by examining the entity’s legal status and structure. But
many courts applying “entity-based” reasoning either reach overbroad conclusions
that limit recoveries of future litigants or avoid applying the arm-of-the-state doctrine at all—and sometimes a circuit does a bit of both.
This Comment proposes a reworking of the arm-of-the-state doctrine to make
it more suitable for application to modern government, in which local, state, and
federal entities interact through a complex web of relationships. Under the proposed
approach, courts apply their arm-of-the-state tests only to the entity activity at issue
in a lawsuit, rather than to the entity as a whole. This “activity-based” approach
narrows the scope of arm-of-the-state holdings so that they more accurately reflect
allocations of power between a state and a local entity, which can vary according to
the activity that a local entity performs. The activity-based approach is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s arm-of-the-state jurisprudence and parallels the Court’s
approach to evaluating entities under the municipal liability doctrine. The proposed
adaptation might well encourage more, and more consistent, application of the doctrine, reintroducing federalism concerns into analyses of state-local relationships.
Further, the activity-based approach both aligns defendants’ liability more closely
with control and ensures that potential future plaintiffs retain access to the federal
courts over truly local entity action. Narrowing the doctrine’s scope ensures that it
protects fully and only the action that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to
protect.
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INTRODUCTION
A police officer suspects someone of being an undocumented
immigrant and detains them.1 Later, that individual sues the local police department in federal court for establishing a policy of
hardline immigration enforcement that violated their Fourth

1
This Comment consciously uses the singular “they.” While it is not “considered
fully acceptable in formal writing, [it is] steadily gaining ground.” The Chicago Manual of
Style, § 5.256 (Chicago 17th ed 2017).
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Amendment rights. The department defends itself by asserting
that it is an “arm of the state”—an entity so closely bound up with
the state that it accesses the state’s sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment,2 exempting the department from suit
in federal court. Will the department succeed in its defense and
get the case dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction?
Based on the current legal landscape, this question remains
unresolved. Different circuits apply different tests for determining whether a local entity is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Most circuits assume that an entity
either is or is not an arm of the state, and that status applies regardless of the activity at issue (an approach this Comment refers
to as “entity-based”). Other circuits consider the activity at issue
and the strength of the state’s relationship with the entity in regard
to that activity (an approach this Comment refers to as “activitybased”). Notably, the latter approach allows an entity’s arm-ofthe-state status to vary depending on the nature of the entity’s
challenged activity.
When courts apply an entity-based arm-of-the-state test mechanically, there are predictable problems of over- and underinclusiveness. The practical effects on plaintiffs of a finding that the
defendant is an arm of the state are that (1) plaintiffs may not be
able to get a federal court to evaluate a given policy that they believe is unconstitutional, and (2) they may lose the ability to sue
that defendant over unrelated actions in the future.
Theoretically, even if the local entity is deemed an arm of the
state and is thus out of a federal court’s reach, plaintiffs may still
sue local officers who carried out the policy in their individual capacities. However, this provides limited practical recourse.3 Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to

2
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” US Const
Amend XI.
3
For a nuanced discussion of qualified immunity’s role in litigation, see Joanna C.
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 Yale L J 2, 36–51 (2017). Professor
Schwartz observes that “[a]lthough qualified immunity is rarely the [formal] reason that
Section 1983 cases end, there are other ways in which qualified immunity doctrine might
influence the litigation of constitutional claims against law enforcement.” Id at 50. When
suits actually proceed past that question, “[p]olice officers are virtually always indemnified” by their municipal employers. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 NYU
L Rev 885, 936–37 (2014) (explaining empirical results). While this poses problems for the
“assumptions of financial responsibility relied upon in civil rights doctrine,” this would not
be too much of a problem for plaintiffs if the goal is merely compensation. Id at 890. But
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make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions,”4 and protects officers from damages suits as long as their
conduct does not violate “clearly established law.”5 There is little
guidance on “how factually similar a prior decision must be to the
instant case in order for the law to be ‘clearly established.’”6 If an
officer is following or establishing an official policy, presumably
the policy’s constitutionality is at least a colorable legal question.
Under the “clearly established” standard required to overcome
the qualified immunity of individual officers, such ambiguity
likely means an officer acting pursuant to an official policy is entitled to qualified immunity if sued personally. This means that a
plaintiff’s only viable option is to sue the local entity over the policy.7 Thus, a court holding that the entity is an arm of the state
on an entity-wide basis can severely impede potential plaintiffs’
access to justice.
A mechanical application of the entity-based arm-of-the-state
approach can harm defendants in its indiscriminate broadness,
as well. For example, a conclusion that defendants are not arms
of the state means that they face liability in the future for actions
mandated by state policies they cannot influence. Adding to all
these problems, however, is that circuits employing an entitybased approach often do not apply their doctrine mechanically.
Anticipating the issues discussed above, these circuits sometimes
try to twist out of the entity-based strictures or avoid applying

as described above, the qualified immunity doctrine in the context of dubiously constitutional official policy likely provides a barrier that most plaintiffs cannot overcome.
4
Ashcroft v al-Kidd, 563 US 731, 743 (2011).
5
Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has even commented that the qualified immunity doctrine protects “all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 341 (1986).
6
Schwartz, 89 NYU L Rev at 893 (cited in note 3). See also Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57
NYU Ann Surv Am L 445, 447–48, 459 (2000) (discussing the “philosophical challenge”
posed by the “clearly established” standard and circuits’ different interpretive approaches).
7
It is helpful to plaintiffs that courts do not see qualified immunity as bearing on
the question of municipal liability. See, for example, Bass v Pottawatomie County Public
Safety Center, 425 Fed Appx 713, 718 (10th Cir 2011) (rejecting a municipality’s inconsistent verdict argument in response to the jury finding the municipality liable while the
individual officer was protected by qualified immunity); Christensen v Park City Municipal
Corp, 554 F3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir 2009) (finding individual officers to be protected by
qualified immunity but that “[t]he defense of qualified immunity is not available to a
municipality such as Park City”); Watson v City of Kansas City, 857 F2d 690, 697 (10th
Cir 1988) (“[T]here is nothing anomalous about allowing [ ] a suit [against the city] to
proceed when immunity [based on a lack of clearly established law] shields the individual
defendants.”).
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the arm-of-the-state doctrine altogether.8 They may seek refuge
in the other immunity doctrines, all of which use activity-specific
reasoning to capture the intricacies of the modern administrative
state. These other doctrines explain, for example, that government officials are protected from money damages suits instituted
against them individually, either through “absolute” immunity
(for certain functions)9 or qualified, good-faith immunity (for
every other function).10 State governments are usually immune
through the Eleventh Amendment.11 Under the municipal liability doctrine, local governmental entities are immune from § 1983
liability unless their “official municipal policy of some nature
caused a constitutional tort.”12 When courts seek to avoid the
“hammer” of an entity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine in favor of
the “scalpels” available in other immunity doctrines, they reduce
the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s relevance in contexts they find
particularly troublesome—and reduce the coherence of the circuit’s arm-of-the-state doctrine as a whole. The entity-based interpretation and the struggles to implement it prevent the armof-the-state doctrine from being able to work substantive justice
by properly aligning liability with power within state-local
relationships.
This Comment argues that the circuit split over an activitybased or entity-based arm-of-the-state inquiry should be resolved
in favor of the former. Further, it provides a model for this adaptation: each circuit should add into its existing arm-of-the-state
test an activity hinge factor. Just as the term “hinge” implies a

8

See Part II.C.1.
See, for example, Forrester v White, 484 US 219, 223–24 (1988) (explaining the
policy motivations behind absolute immunity findings).
10 See generally, for example, Procunier v Navarette, 434 US 555 (1978) (prison officials have good faith immunity); Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308 (1975) (school officials
have good faith immunity); Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547 (1967) (police officers have a defense
of good faith against § 1983 claims).
11 However, Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity by making a clear
statement of intent to abrogate it and acting pursuant to constitutional authority. Although
Article I of the Constitution does not give Congress the power to strip states of their sovereign immunity, Congress can use powers conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Tennessee v Lane, 541 US 509, 517
(2004). It is important to note that Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity with
respect to individual suits alleging civil rights violations against local or state entities,
which are the topic of this Comment.
12 Monell v Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 US 658, 691
(1978). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.6 at 561 (7th ed Aspen
2016). For a discussion of § 1983 liability, see Part I.A.3.
9
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device that allows flexibility in a machine, the activity hinge factor in the arm-of-the-state test allows courts to adjust the level of
abstraction at which they consider the test’s other factors. Applying the activity hinge factor first, the court uses state law to define the activity that the defendant was engaged in when the
harm giving rise to suit occurred. Then, the court considers the
test’s other factors—such as state intent, monetary impact, and
state control—only as they relate to that particular activity. The
activity hinge factor’s scope-defining function is modeled on the
municipal liability doctrine’s threshold process for defining the
scope of its own analysis.13 Before analyzing whether a municipality may be sued under 42 USC § 1983, the municipal liability doctrine uses state law to define the relevant activity at the outset.
This activity-specific use of state law, familiar to all of the circuits, thus provides a means by which a circuit can narrow the
scope of its arm-of-the-state test’s other factors. This allows the
factors bearing on sovereign immunity concerns to focus on the
state’s relationship with the local entity within the activity at issue, not in the abstract.
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit already illustrates what is possible with a narrow, activity-specific approach. That circuit divides its factors into two subsequent steps, the first of which is
deciding what activity will be evaluated. In the second step,
courts in this circuit evaluate the other four factors in the circuit’s
arm-of-the-state test only as they relate to the specific activity.14
The Eleventh Circuit does not explicitly use the municipal liability doctrine for guidance. This Comment suggests that circuits should do so not because the municipal liability doctrine’s
guidance is necessary, but rather because it offers entity-based
courts an easier transition to a new mode of analysis, relying on
something they already know.
There are many reasons for adopting an activity-based armof-the-state doctrine. In addition to realizing the doctrine’s potential to do substantive justice through narrower, more accurate
holdings, an activity-based approach achieves broader constitutional objectives. A narrower approach to sovereign immunity

13 Part I.A.3 discusses the historical development and substantive analysis of the
municipal liability doctrine. Part III discusses the threshold inquiry and how it may be
incorporated into this Comment’s proposed activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine.
14 See, for example, Lake v Skelton, 840 F3d 1334, 1337–38 (11th Cir 2016) (explaining the Eleventh Circuit’s two-part arm-of-the-state test). This approach is further discussed in Part II.B.
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would allow the Eleventh Amendment and general federalism
principles to be more effectively realized in modern government.
Current governmental entities are myriad and include intricately
designed allocations of federal, state, and local power. An arm-ofthe-state doctrine that awards or withholds sovereign immunity
in one fell swoop over an entity cannot accurately capture the nuanced state-local relationships that exist in modern government.
In order to ensure that the modern arm-of-the-state doctrine protects fully and only the entity behavior that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to protect, it needs an activity-based update.
Additionally, this shift would harmonize the level of abstraction at which existing arm-of-the-state test factors are applied
with the level of abstraction employed in other immunity doctrines. This cross-doctrinal harmony would reduce the incentive
for courts to twist or avoid the arm-of-the-state doctrine and create unpredictable results. It would also offer the Supreme Court
a more consistent and predictable legal basis for clarifying which
arm-of-the-state factors are most important for sovereign immunity purposes, and to what degree.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I sketches the
purposes and substance of the relevant immunity doctrines before
delving into the Supreme Court’s sparse guidance on how to identify arms of the state. Part II details the existing split between
circuits that use an entity-based approach when deciding whether
an entity is an arm of the state and those that use an activitybased approach. Part III explains how the municipal liability doctrine’s threshold inquiry may be implemented as the doctrinal
guide for entity-based circuits, allowing these circuits to adopt an
activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine without wholly giving up
their existing arm-of-the-state tests. Part III also addresses why
the municipal liability doctrine is the correct choice for this role,
compared to other activity-based immunity doctrines. Finally,
Part IV addresses the broader reasons justifying the activitybased shift.
I. BACKGROUND LAW
This Comment focuses on the arm-of-the-state doctrine, an
outgrowth of the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity for
states. However, understanding other immunity doctrines sheds
light on the far-reaching implications of the entity-based arm-ofthe-state doctrine and this Comment’s recommendation to rein it
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in. To that end, this Part gives an overview of the various immunity doctrines implicated by this Comment. It includes the municipality doctrine, which is not strictly speaking an immunity doctrine but rather an immunity-creating schema of statutory
construction. This Part then delves into the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s development at the Supreme Court.
A.

Immunity Doctrines Broadly

This Section considers the Eleventh Amendment, which protects the states from being haled into federal court against their
will, and various immunities besides arm-of-the-state immunity
that apply to officers or entities.
1. The Eleventh Amendment and the birth of the arm-ofthe-state doctrine.
Passed by Congress in 1794 and ratified by the states in 1795,
the Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.”15 In plain language, the text of this Amendment disallows any citizen of a different or foreign state from suing a state in federal court. The principal motivation for the
amendment was the states’ concern that “federal courts would
force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their
financial ruin.”16 In Hans v Louisiana,17 the Court interpreted the
Amendment even more broadly, explaining that the country’s
foundational principles, if not the text of the Amendment itself,
rendered the states immune from suits brought by their own citizens as well.18
While the financial aspect was the most concrete interest motivating the Amendment, the Amendment protects an ideal of
American federalism as well: the dignity of the states within the

15

US Const Amend XI.
Hess v Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 US 30, 39 (1994), quoting
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens dissenting). The Eleventh Amendment was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793), in which the Court recognized the
right of those who were not citizens of a given state to sue that state. Id at 431.
17 134 US 1 (1890).
18 Id at 21 (declaring the “rule which exempts a sovereign state from prosecution in
a court of justice at the suit of individuals”).
16
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republican system. “The very object and purpose of the [Eleventh]
Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties.”19 Being summoned as a defendant in such a suit “was
thought to be neither becoming nor convenient” for a state.20 As
such, the “Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States,
although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity.”21 In the modern era, the Court refers to financial liability and state dignity as “the Eleventh
Amendment’s twin reasons for being.”22
The arm-of-the-state doctrine imputes to certain qualifying
local entities a state’s Eleventh Amendment protection. Traditionally, states and their agencies gain the protection,23 while
counties and municipalities do not.24 The reason for this was that
the state “design[s]” the “internal structure” of state agencies,
while political subdivisions such as cities, towns, and counties
“function as independent corporate bodies.”25 At one time, this distinction directly implicated whether a money judgment would be
satisfied from the state treasury.26 Thus, as the doctrine has developed, the essential question has become whether the defendant organization—a school board, a county, a city—is “an arm of

19

In re Ayers, 123 US 443, 505 (1887).
Id.
21 Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v Metcalf & Eddy, Inc, 506 US 139, 146
(1993). See also Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 13 (1890), quoting Alexander Hamilton. See
Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 541, 548 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed)
(“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent.”) (emphasis in original).
22 Hess, 513 US at 47.
23 See, for example, Will v Michigan Department of State Police, 491 US 58, 66 (1989);
Alabama v Pugh, 438 US 781, 782 (1978) (holding that a suit against the State Board of
Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
24 See, for example, Moor v County of Alameda, 411 US 693, 717–21 (1973) (concluding that a municipality is “treated as a citizen of California” rather than an arm of the
state); Lincoln County v Luning, 133 US 529, 530 (1890) (holding that a municipality is
not an arm of the state but “part of the State only in that remote sense in which any city,
town, or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of the State”).
25 Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 Colum L Rev
1243, 1246 (1992). See also Luning, 133 US at 530.
26 See Ford Motor Co v Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 US 459, 464 (1945).
See also Pennhurst, 465 US at 101 (describing the test as whether the state is “the real,
substantial party in interest”).
20
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the State partaking of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity” rather than a “political subdivision to which the Eleventh
Amendment does not extend.”27
The alignment between money judgments running against
the state treasury and the distinction between political subdivisions and state agencies has become less clear, however, assuming it was ever as clear as the Court thought.28 As for the political
subdivision–state agency distinction, modern entities often blend
features of the two, leaving courts in a bind when classifying an
entity for Eleventh Amendment purposes.29 The difficulties in
classifying are compounded by the fact that the Court has not
given any definitive guidance on what features matter, and how
much, in determining whether an entity is a state arm or not.30
2. Immunity for officers.
Immunity for government officials refers to immunity for government actors in their personal capacity—when the plaintiff
seeks damages from the individual officer.31 This principle has a
long history and an important practical purpose. Some degree of
immunity from liability is necessary to ensure that government
actors continue to perform their duties without fear of lawsuits
chilling their legitimate activity. However, courts have to balance
that interest against the values of compensating plaintiffs for
harms and deterring government officials from behaving inappropriately.32 In an effort to balance these dueling needs, courts have
established an array of immunity doctrines.
Absolute immunity protects those performing judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial functions. The “focus is on the function

27

Mount Healthy City School District v Doyle, 429 US 274, 280 (1977).
See Part II.C.2 for a more detailed discussion of the monetary judgment factor and
its role in entity-based arm-of-the-state doctrines.
29 See Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1247 (cited in note 25) (discussing the difficulties presented by interstate port authorities, levee boards, tourism companies, industrial insurance system agencies, potato commissions, and cement plants).
30 This tension and its implications for the arm-of-the-state doctrine are discussed in
Part I.B.
31 See Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 806–08 (1982). When the plaintiff seeks
damages from the official’s employer, the immunities and liabilities refer to the state or
local entity. See McMillian v Monroe County, 520 US 781, 785 n 2 (1997) (explaining how
a suit against an officer in his official capacity is a suit against the entity the officer
represents).
32 See Harlow, 457 US at 807. See also Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308, 317–20 (1975)
(explaining the reasoning and balancing of values underlying qualified and absolute immunity as applied in the school official context).
28
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performed, rather than the title possessed.”33 Thus, an official
may not successfully claim absolute immunity in the future for an
activity merely because they previously obtained immunity for an
unrelated activity. The Court has consistently attempted to limit
absolute immunity.34 It “presum[es] [ ] that qualified rather than
absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in
the exercise of their duties” and thus limits absolute immunity
protection to its scope at common law unless the official persuades
the court that “immunity is justified for the function in question.”35 For instance, the Court has granted absolute immunity
only in regard to money damages for judicial acts,36 the legislative
function,37 prosecutorial functions,38 and police officers in their capacity as witnesses.39 This core of absolutely immune functions
has given rise to various subgroups. For example, some courts refer to arm-of-the-sentencing-judge and quasi-judicial immunity,
which derive from judicial immunity. These immunities similarly
cover only certain relevant activities and not everything the defendant could do.40 The Supreme Court has only granted absolute

33 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.6 at 568 (cited in note 12) (emphasis in
original).
34 See, for example, Forrester v White, 484 US 219, 224 (1988) (“This Court has generally been quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute official immunity . . . [and]
careful not to extend the scope of the protection further than its purposes require.”). See
also Wood, 420 US at 320 (explaining that the common law development of school official
immunity doctrine shows an “implicit” judgment “that absolute immunity would not be
justified since it would not sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise
their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a remedy for students
subjected to intentional or otherwise inexcusable deprivations”).
35 Burns v Reed, 500 US 478, 486–87.
36 See, for example, Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 349, 358–59 (1978) (holding that a
judge who issued an order to sterilize a fifteen-year-old girl, without any case filed, was
entitled to absolute immunity for giving that order). A federal statute, the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1996, later extended absolute immunity for judges from only suits for
monetary judgments to suits for injunctive relief as well. Pub L No 104-317, § 309(c), 110
Stat 3847, 3853, codified at 42 USC § 1983.
37 Federal congresspersons and their aides are absolutely immune from suits for
damages and prospective relief. US Const, Art I, § 6. The Court has bestowed similar absolute immunity on state and local legislators for suits for money damages and equitable
remedies. See Bogan v Scott-Harris, 523 US 44, 52 (1998). All of this immunity, however,
only applies to legislative tasks. See Gravel v United States, 408 US 606, 625 (1972).
38 See, for example, Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 424 (1976) (recognizing a prosecutor’s immunity from suit for damages for knowingly using perjured testimony to incarcerate an innocent person for nine years).
39 See generally Briscoe v LaHue, 460 US 325 (1983) (providing absolute immunity
to a police officer who gave perjured testimony from a damages suit).
40 See, for example, Walrath v United States, 35 F3d 277, 282 (7th Cir 1994) (discussing how “[m]ost federal courts . . . [hold] that parole board members are absolutely
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immunity that is not limited to the performance of certain functions to the President of the United States.41
A government official enjoys qualified immunity, or goodfaith immunity, when they are acting in the scope of their employment but are not entitled to absolute immunity.42 Qualified
immunity “represents the norm” for executive branch officials.43
It only protects against suits for “liability for civil damages insofar as [the official’s] conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”44 It does not protect against suits for injunctive relief.45 Unlike other immunities such as absolute immunity
and sovereign immunity, plaintiffs may overcome qualified immunity, but only by satisfying a very high burden.46
3. The municipal liability doctrine.
The municipal liability doctrine is not a common law immunity doctrine but rather a matter of statutory construction that
sometimes results in immunity for qualifying officials and entities. This doctrine determines which defendants may be sued under 42 USC § 1983. This Comment distinguishes between (1) this
doctrine’s threshold decision regarding the level of abstraction at
which the court should conduct its substantive analysis, and
(2) the substantive analysis that may practically result in immunity. This Section focuses on the substantive analysis of the

immune from suit for their decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole” and that those particular activities are entitled to arm-of-the-sentencing-judge immunity); Draine v Leavy,
504 Fed Appx 494, 495 (6th Cir 2012) (recognizing that “quasi-judicial immunity does not
apply to functions performed by state parole officers that are not judicial in nature”); Buckley v Fitzsimmons, 509 US 259, 277 (1993) (explaining the “functional approach of Imbler,
which conforms to the common-law theory,” and reaffirming the functional approach to
immunity for executive officers); Imbler, 424 US at 430 (“[R]espondent’s activities were
intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.”).
41 See Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 US 731, 748–54 (1982).
42 See id at 764 (White dissenting).
43 Buckley, 509 US at 273, quoting Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 340 (1986).
44 Harlow, 457 US at 818.
45 See, for example, Valley v Rapides Parish School Board, 118 F3d 1047 (5th Cir
1997) (upholding injunction against school board); Ying Jing Gan v City of New York, 996
F2d 522 (2d Cir 1993) (recognizing a valid claim against a police department as to injunctive relief, but not as to damages). See also Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.6 at 582
(cited in note 12).
46 See, for example, Crawford-El v Britton, 523 US 574, 586–87 (1998). See also, for
example, Medina v Cram, 252 F3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir 2001) (stating that “[a]fter a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff”).
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municipal liability doctrine to better situate the doctrine within
the parties’ argumentative toolbox. Later, Part III examines the
doctrine’s threshold inquiry, which informs this Comment’s proposed activity-specific approach.
Under § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a civil action against “person[s]” for an alleged “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” that occur “under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any
State or Territory.”47 Because § 1983 forms “the basis for almost
all constitutional rulings arising from the actions of state and local governments and their officers,” the municipal liability doctrine effectively determines whether a local entity will be sued or
not.48 The statute thus raises the question of who or what constitutes a “person.” In Monroe v Pape,49 the Court gave its first answer. The plaintiffs in Monroe sued the City of Chicago and certain officials, alleging an unreasonable search and seizure
conducted “under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations,
customs and usages of Illinois and of the City of Chicago.”50 The
Court held that the word “person” in § 1983 did not include municipalities, and thus that the complaint against the City had
been properly dismissed below.51
In Monell v Department of Social Services of the City of New
York,52 the Court changed its mind.53 In this case, female employees of the Department of Social Services and the New York Board
of Education sued various municipal officials and entities under
§ 1983.54 Plaintiffs challenged the defendants’ official policy “compel[ing] pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.”55 The lower

47

42 USC § 1983.
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.1 at 512 (cited in note 12). See also Debra
L. Zorn, Municipal Liability under Section 1983 – Williams v. Butler, 18 Creighton L Rev
1267, 1267 (1984) (“Civil rights actions based on section 1983 constitute almost one-third
of all federal question litigation brought by private parties in federal courts.”), citing
George Christie, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts, 1115 n 1 (West 5th ed 1983).
49 365 US 167 (1961).
50 Id at 169 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
51 Id at 191–92. Monroe also explained that “under color of enumerated state authority” for purposes of § 1983 included actions in which officials “abuse[d] [their] position.”
Monroe, 365 US at 172 (quotation marks omitted). This aspect of Monroe remains good
law, but it is not the focus of this Comment.
52 436 US 658 (1978).
53 Id at 694.
54 Id at 660–61.
55 Id at 661.
48
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court agreed that the actions were unconstitutional, but it nevertheless denied plaintiffs’ request for backpay because any damages would have been paid by the City of New York.56 Granting
that relief, the lower court reasoned, would “circumvent the immunity” that Monroe v Pape had previously conferred on municipalities sued under § 1983 when it held that local governments
did not qualify as statutory people.57 On appeal, the Court reversed Monroe on that point, holding instead that local governments are “‘persons’ who may be defendants in § 1983 suits,”58 in
addition to the officials themselves. More than a decade later, in
Will v Michigan Department of State Police,59 the Court further
clarified the statutory person by explaining that “neither a State
nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”60
These decisions taken together answer the question of whom,
in a given case, a plaintiff can sue. Monell explained that local
entities may only be sued over constitutional harms caused by
their official policy or unofficial custom, not on a respondeat superior theory for their employees’ constitutional torts.61 For a
plaintiff to sue both the employee in a personal capacity and the
entity, the constitutional tort must have occurred pursuant to the
entity’s custom or official policy. Otherwise, the plaintiff may only
sue the employee in a personal capacity.62 Will supplements the
analysis by explaining that if the officials or the policy were attributable to the state, not the local entity, then plaintiffs may
sue neither the state nor the officials in their official capacity.63 In
effect, plaintiffs cannot seek monetary damages if a government
official or local entity acted pursuant to an official state policy.64
56 Monell, 436 US at 662. Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive and declaratory relief was
held moot because after the complaint had been filed, the City and Board changed the
harmful policy. Id at 661.
57 Id at 662 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
58 Id at 700–01.
59 491 US 58 (1989).
60 Id at 71.
61 Monell, 436 US at 663 n 7, 690–91.
62 Monell explained in a footnote that the ability to bring an official-capacity suit
against an official runs with the ability to bring suit against the employing entity itself.
See id at 690 n 55 (stating that a necessary implication of its holding was that “local government officials sued in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983” when the “local government would be suable in its own name”).
63 Will, 491 US at 71 (explaining that a suit against an official’s office is “no different
from a suit against the State itself”).
64 Plaintiffs may still sue state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief
for constitutional violations. Ex parte Young, 209 US 123, 159–60 (1908). In such a case,
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Notably, this schematic interpretation of § 1983 reflects the
complex distribution of state and local power in modern government. Not everything that a local entity does is pursuant to a local
policy; states can and do direct local entities and offices to conduct
certain actions.65 The municipal liability doctrine is able to account for these nuances, while the entity-based arm-of-the-state
doctrine—by judging a governmental entity as either entirely
state or entirely local—cannot.66
The Court articulated the municipal liability doctrine’s process for deciding whether a policy or an official is truly local or
state in character in McMillian v Monroe County.67 In this case,
the plaintiff brought a § 1983 suit against the county and many
officials after the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
his murder conviction because the state illegally suppressed evidence.68 To determine whether the defendants could be sued under § 1983, the Court first considered “whether Alabama sheriffs
are policymakers for the State or for the county when they act in
a law enforcement capacity.”69
The Court noted that it was “not seeking to make a characterization of Alabama sheriffs that will hold true for every type of
official action they engage in,” but rather was evaluating whether
the sheriff “represents the State or the county when he acts in a
law enforcement capacity.”70 It explained that a plaintiff’s ability
to sue a local entity or official under § 1983—whether they count
as “persons”—depends on “whether [the implicated] governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a
particular area.”71 If the official acts on behalf of a local entity,
then the official and the local entity are both “persons” suable under § 1983. If the official acts on behalf of the state, then the local
the official “would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.” Will, 491 US at 71 n 10 (quotation
marks omitted), quoting Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159, 167 n 14 (1985).
65 See note 188.
66 This Comment focuses on the circuit split between what it terms entity-based and
activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrines and recommends adopting the activity-based
approach. Part II explains the differences and consequences of each approach.
67 520 US 781 (1997).
68 Id at 783–84.
69 Id at 785.
70 Id at 785–86.
71 McMillan, 520 US at 785. See also Jett v Dallas Independent School District, 491
US 701, 737 (1989) (explaining the policymaker inquiry as “identify[ing] those officials or
governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or
statutory violation at issue”).
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entity is not implicated by the official’s actions. As such, the local
entity cannot be sued under the statute, and the “state” official
can only be reached for injunctive relief.72 Rather than elucidating
a particular test, the Court conducted a detailed, fact-intensive
evaluation of the relevant state constitution and code.73 It concluded that Alabama sheriffs were state officials in the particular
activity of “law enforcement.”74 Thus, the county could not be sued
because the policy was set by an effectively state-aligned official,
not a local official. And the sheriff could not be sued in his official
capacity, at least for damages, because he was a state official in
the particular activity giving rise to the suit.
All federal courts conduct the municipal liability analysis in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in McMillian. For
purposes of this Comment, the most significant feature of this
analysis is that it results in narrow holdings. For example, future
plaintiffs may still sue an Alabama sheriff if the unconstitutional
actions were taken outside of the “law enforcement capacity.”75
The municipal liability doctrine, then, practically provides a potential activity-specific immunity to local entity defendants from
§ 1983 suits.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Unclear, Case-by-Case Development
of Its Arm-of-the-State Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court has faced the question of whether a local
entity qualifies as an arm of the state many times over the years.
In deciding this question, the Court has been inconsistent and has
not definitively laid down a test for circuits to follow.76 A “tension

72

See notes 63–64.
McMillian, 520 US at 787–93. This substantive approach is different from that of
the arm-of-the-state doctrine, which evaluates various factors in light of state law. This
Comment advocates adopting only the municipal liability doctrine’s use of state law to
identify and focus on the relevant activity at issue, not its substantive approach. See
Part III.
74 McMillian, 520 US at 793.
75 Id at 786. This may seem like cold comfort, but, in fact, sheriffs can undertake
many activities besides law enforcement, depending on state law. For example, in California,
the activities of administering jails, investigating crimes, and obtaining and executing a
search warrant are analyzed distinctly. See Hurth v County of Los Angeles, 2009 WL
10699013, *2 (CD Cal) (providing an overview of the Ninth Circuit’s function-specific municipal liability conclusions concerning sheriffs).
76 Jameson B. Bilsborrow, Comment, Keeping the Arms in Touch: Taking Political
Accountability Seriously in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 64 Emory
L J 819, 822, 827 (2015). One commentator has even referred to the doctrine as in a state
of “disarray.” Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1296 (cited in note 25).
73
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between two lines of Supreme Court decisions” concerning the
factors’ relative weights has developed.77 In some cases, the Court
finds the factor of whether a monetary judgment against the local
entity would run against the state treasury to be decisive. In other
cases, the Court has engaged in generalized balancing of whatever factors it seems to find relevant to the inquiry. The discussion of cases below illustrates the development of this split
chronologically.
In Edelman v Jordan,78 the Court affirmed the significance of
financial impact on the state treasury in the arm-of-the-state
analysis.79 The plaintiff brought a class action for injunctive and
declaratory relief, and the lower courts imposed a permanent injunction and required state officials to award retroactive benefits.80 The Supreme Court reversed as to the retroactive payment,
stating that a “suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability
which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”81 The inquiry focused exclusively on the monetary liability question. The Court also noted its
longstanding position that a “county does not occupy the same position as a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment,”82 but
it suggested that there may be room for flexibility within this rule.
It stated that county action is “generally” state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, but a county defendant is “not necessarily a state defendant” for purposes of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.83 This phrasing of the distinction suggests that some
counties or “political subdivisions” could qualify as arms of the
state and therefore be entitled to immunity. However, the Court
did not go on to address the specific circumstances in which those
qualifications would be met.
Three years later in Mount Healthy City School District v
Doyle,84 the Court formally introduced the term “arm of the
State.”85 An untenured teacher sued the Mount Healthy school
board for reinstatement and damages, claiming that the decision

77 Jonathan W. Needle, Note, The Arm of the State Analysis in Eleventh Amendment
Jurisprudence, 6 Rev Litig 193, 196 (1987).
78 415 US 651 (1974).
79 Id at 667–71.
80 Id at 653–56.
81 Id at 663, 678.
82 Edelman, 415 US at 667 n 12, citing Luning, 133 US at 530.
83 Id.
84 429 US 274 (1977).
85 Id at 280.
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to not rehire him violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.86 The district court found for the plaintiff teacher.87 As to
the question of “whether the Board was entitled to immunity from
suit in the federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment,” the
district court found it “unnecessary” to reach “because it decided
that any such immunity had been waived by Ohio statute and decisional law.”88 The Supreme Court disagreed with that assessment and decided to address the question.89 To do so, it engaged
in a fact-intensive analysis of the entity’s characteristics.90 Even
though the plaintiff’s requested remedy included monetary damages, the Court did not address whether a money judgment would
run against the state treasury—the very question that Edelman
suggested would be decisive in determining whether a defendant
entity was an arm of the state.91 Mount Healthy stated that the
answer to whether the local Board of Education was an arm of the
state “depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity created by state law.”92 The Court looked at the state statutory definitions of the entity, the entity’s monetary dependence on the
state, and the state’s level of “guidance” or control over the entity.93 It also noted that the local school boards in the state “have
extensive powers to issue bonds” and “levy taxes within certain
restrictions of state law”94—factors that could have easily related
to the money judgment consideration key to Edelman. Yet without looking in that direction, the Court concluded that “[o]n balance,” a local school board “is more like a county or city than it is
like an arm of the State” and therefore is not entitled to sovereign
immunity.95
Edelman and Mount Healthy thus established two dueling
lines of arm-of-the-state precedents, emphasizing different factors and providing little guidance as to which factors were decisive or at least more significant. In subsequent cases, the Court
added even more factual considerations to the arm-of-the-state

86

Id at 276, 282.
Id at 276.
88 Mount Healthy, 429 US at 279.
89 Id at 279–80.
90 Id at 280–81.
91 Id at 277 (analyzing suit for reinstatement and $50,000 in damages). See also note
81 and accompanying text.
92 Mount Healthy, 429 US at 280.
93 Id at 280–81.
94 Id at 280.
95 Id.
87
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inquiry. In Lake Country Estates, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,96 a case about a bistate agency claiming immunity, the
Court consolidated these earlier lines of cases, which were arguably inconsistent. Lake Country mentions the Mount Healthy factors of state law’s characterization of the entity and the state’s
level of guidance or control, which may be inferred from features
such as a potential “veto” power over the entity’s decisions.97 It
also considered the Edelman factor of whether the “state treasury
[would be] directly responsible for judgments against” the entity.98 In addition, it considered some new factors: whether the
governing members were local or state officials, whether the entity’s obligations bound a state, whether there was a history of
litigation between the entity and the state (because such a history
suggests a lack of state control), and whether the function that
motivated the entity’s creation and led to the dispute in question
was “traditionally . . . performed” at the local or state level.99 The
Court did not mention the Mount Healthy factors of taxes and
bonds, but it did observe that “[f]unding . . . must be provided by
the counties, not the States.”100
In Hess v Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp,101 the Court reaffirmed the Lake Country factors and again included Edelman’s
state treasury factor as one of many factors to consider.102 This
time, however, it stated that “the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury” was the “impetus” for the Eleventh Amendment.103 It discussed at length, and
96

440 US 391 (1979).
Id at 401–02. See also id at 401 & n 19 (referencing Mount Healthy before conducting its analysis).
98 Lake Country, 440 US at 402.
99 Id.
100 Id at 401–02. This mandate was provided in the Compact Agreement, the agreement made between the two states and consented to by Congress, which created the bistate entity raising the Eleventh Amendment claim. Id at 393–94. Lake Country’s facts,
then, turned on the intricacies of the Agreement rather than state law. In later cases, the
Court clarified that bistate agencies claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity under compact agreements and local entities claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity under state
law are evaluated the same way. See Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452, 456 n 1 (1997). See also
generally Regents of the University of California v Doe, 519 US 425 (1997). Some courts,
however, still recognize minute distinctions between arm-of-the-state doctrine applications to intrastate and Compact Clause entities. For example, the DC Circuit asserts that
Hess “recognized a presumption against sovereign immunity for Compact Clause entities.”
Puerto Rico Ports Authority v Federal Maritime Commission, 531 F3d 868, 872 (2008),
citing Hess, 513 US at 42.
101 513 US 30 (1994).
102 Id at 48–53 (discussing the “state treasury factor”).
103 Id at 48.
97
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with apparent approval, how most of the courts of appeals have
identified the treasury factor as “the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations.”104 Hess stated that when the
factors “point in different directions, the Eleventh Amendment’s
twin reasons for being”—state solvency and dignity—“remain our
prime guide.”105 Thus, if the many factors do not weigh conclusively one way or the other, the monetary impact on the state
treasury may practically be the decisive factor. One circuit court
acknowledged that while Hess “at least indirectly identified the
general factors to be considered,” the decision “is certain to generate confusion.”106
The Court expanded on the relative significance of the monetary judgment factor in Regents of the University of California v
Doe.107 It clarified that state financial liability was “of considerable importance,” but it also noted that the “question can be answered only after considering the provisions of state law that define the agency’s character.”108 The Court explained:
When deciding whether a state instrumentality may invoke
the State’s immunity, our cases have inquired into the relationship between the State and the entity in question. In
making this inquiry, we have sometimes examined the essential [monetary impact on the State] . . . and sometimes focused on the nature of the entity created by state law to determine whether it should be treated as an arm of the
State.109
This language suggests that the fact-intensive considerations
route illustrated in Mount Healthy and Lake Country and the
monetary impact route embodied in Edelman are both acceptable
analytical options for judges. However, the Court’s statement
that state treasury monetary impact is of “considerable importance” suggests that there are not truly two independent
routes of analysis. Rather, these versions of the inquiry have become jumbled over time, with the money judgment factor being
adopted within the Mount Healthy–Lake Country fact-intensive
approach as one of many considerations. However, the Court has
seemingly endorsed the circuits’ interpretation that the monetary
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id. For the court’s full analysis of the state treasury factor, see also id at 48–53.
Hess, 513 US at 47.
Gray v Laws, 51 F3d 426, 431 (4th Cir 1995).
519 US 425 (1997).
Id at 430, 429 n 5.
Id at 429–30 (quotation marks omitted).
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impact factor is the most significant one, although without clarifying exactly how significant it is or what exactly it entails.110 The
Court referred to the prevention of monetary judgments against
state treasuries as the “impetus” and one of the “Eleventh
Amendment’s twin reasons for being.”111
In sum, the doctrine has evolved from a clear but unmanageable rule into a jumble of factors within a generalized balancing
test. The initial distinction between political subdivisions and entities whose judgments would be paid by the state112 could not
hold. As state governments and power expanded, it became clear
that those two categories were not mutually exclusive. Political
entities of a “hybrid” character have features of both state agencies and largely independent public corporations, “defy[ing]
straightforward definition.”113 Faced with this unmanageable legal distinction, the Court gradually incorporated many other factors in addition to monetary judgment. Indeed, the Court possibly
saw this evolution coming even in Edelman, the canonical monetary judgment rule opinion, when it noted the existing Luning
rule that “a county does not occupy the same position as a State
for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment” but also hinted that a
political corporation defendant might in some situations qualify
as a “state defendant.”114
While identifying and weighing the relevant factors in the
arm-of-the-state analysis has occupied most courts’ and commentators’ discussions of the arm-of-the-state doctrine,115 relatively
scarce attention has been paid to the scope of entity activity to
which courts do or should apply these factors. The next Section
explores this doctrinal ambiguity.
110 The court stated that it is the “entity’s potential legal liability for judgments, rather than its ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge
the liability in the first instance, that is relevant in determining the underlying Eleventh
Amendment question.” Id at 425. This language left a lot of ambiguity in the monetary
judgment factor, which this Comment discusses in Part II.C.2.
111 Hess, 513 US at 47–48.
112 See Luning, 133 US at 530 (explaining that political corporations are “part of the
State only in that remote sense in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation
may be said to be” one and not entitling the defendant county to the state’s sovereign
immunity).
113 Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1246–47 (cited in note 25).
114 Edelman, 415 US at 667 n 12.
115 See, for example, Hess, 513 US at 61 (O’Connor dissenting) (suggesting that the
doctrine refocus on the factor of state control over the entity); Bilsborrow, Comment, 64
Emory L J at 847 (cited in note 76) (proposing a new factor to be included in the analysis);
Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1301 (cited in note 25) (proposing that courts conduct a
two-step inquiry).
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The Supreme Court’s Arm-of-the-State Opinions Have
Created New Openings for Addressing and Clarifying the
Scope of the Inquiry

Supreme Court majority opinions have not definitively stated
a preference between a broader arm-of-the-state test that focuses
on the entity’s abstract relationship with the state and an activityspecific one that considers the entity’s relationship with the state
in regard to the particular action giving rise to suit. However,
there are hints that the Court is becoming more receptive to the
notion that what the entity was doing is relevant to the arm-ofthe-state inquiry—and, ultimately, the idea that an entity can be
an arm of the state in the performance of some actions while not
in others.
For example, in Lake Country, the Court noted that “regulation of land use is traditionally a function performed by local governments. Concern with the proper performance of that function
. . . was a primary motivation for the creation of [the entity] itself,
and gave rise to the specific controversy at issue in this litigation.”116 The Court’s treatment of the “function,” or activity, involved in the case is ambiguous in a few ways. The Court mentions that the land use regulation function (1) was the primary
reason for creating the entity and thus its primary function, and
(2) gave rise to this suit in particular. The Court nonetheless
failed to clarify which of these two facts is more important.
Hess further compounds the issue by not identifying what
might happen if some of the entity’s activities are state activities
while others are local activities. In Hess, two railroad workers
filed separate personal injury actions against their employer, a
bistate railway.117 In evaluating whether the defendant railway
was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court noted that “Port Authority functions are not readily
classified as typically state or unquestionably local,” because both
states and municipalities perform them.118 Unable to categorize
the activities as either state or local, the Court in Hess simply
ignored this consideration, declaring that it “does not advance our
Eleventh Amendment inquiry.”119 Thus, it is unclear how the
Court wants judges to use an entity’s activities when determining

116
117
118
119

Lake Country, 440 US at 402.
Hess, 513 US at 33.
Id at 45.
Id.
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the proper level of abstraction at which to analyze arm-of-thestate factors. Is the question whether the entity’s primary activities or purposes are state functions, whether most of the entity’s
activities are state functions, or whether the activity that gave
rise to the suit is a state function? Although the first two questions are abstract in nature, the last question is rooted in the facts
of each case. It asks what the entity was doing and how the state
interacts with the entity with respect to the activity in question.
In this third, activity-based formulation of the question, what the
entity was created for and what proportion of its total statutory
purposes can be categorized as state activities are irrelevant.
What matters is the state’s relationship with the entity’s suitrelated activity.
While Hess did not clarify whether the defendant’s activity
giving rise to the suit matters in the arm-of-the-state analysis,
Regents at least acknowledged that the doctrine is unsettled on
the question of how to define the scope of entity action to which
the many factors will be applied.120 The plaintiff in this case alleged that the University of California had wrongfully breached
its agreement to employ him at a laboratory once it determined
he could not acquire a necessary security clearance from the
Department of Energy, which owned the laboratory.121 The district court held that the University was an arm of the state immune to the suit, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, largely on the ground that the Department of Energy’s
contract with the University would indemnify the state for any
judgment incurred while performing that contract, including this
suit’s.122 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that legal liability, rather than financial liability and the state’s ability to find
a third-party indemnifier, mattered in evaluating the monetary
judgment factor.123 It also addressed but declined to “decide
whether there may be some state instrumentalities that qualify
as ‘arms of the State’ for some purposes but not others.”124 That
possibility is, of course, a necessary conclusion of the activitybased approach proposed in this Comment.
120 Indeed, the entity-based circuits have struggled to reconcile this uncertainty as to
the scope of the arm-of-the-state analysis with their steadfast belief in the entity-based
approach. This tension is especially evident in their handling of the monetary judgment
factor, which is discussed in Part II.C.2.
121 Regents, 519 US at 426–27.
122 Id at 427–28.
123 Id at 431.
124 Id at 427 n 2.
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A more recent case, Northern Insurance Co of New York v
Chatham County, Georgia,125 offered further hints that the Court
might be open to an activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine. In
that case, the Court considered whether an insurance company
could bring an admiralty suit against a county seeking damages
stemming from a malfunctioning drawbridge incident.126 The
Court did not fully engage with its arm-of-the-state analysis or
comment negatively on any of its prior decisions, but it noted that
determining the scope of the inquiry might be important. It
phrased the relevant question as whether “the County . . . was
acting as an arm of the State when it operated [a] drawbridge.”127
This language suggests an activity-based approach based on
“bridge operation” activities specifically. However, the Court did
not dig any deeper into the inquiry before upholding the lower
court’s ruling based on the defendant county’s concession that
it did not qualify as an arm of the state entitled to sovereign
immunity.128
While these cases hardly show enthusiasm for clarifying
the scope of the arm-of-the-state inquiry one way or the other,
they do create openings that would justify such a clarification—
and further justify adopting an activity-based arm-of-the-state inquiry. Commentators have dismissed the consequences of the
activity-based approach and criticized the Court for “ma[king]
possible the contradiction where a type of entity can be an arm of
the state in one instance but not be an arm of the state in another
instance.”129 But this is precisely the approach this Comment
125

547 US 189 (2006).
Id at 192.
127 Id at 197 (emphasis added).
128 Id at 195.
129 Bilsborrow, Comment, 64 Emory L J at 826 (cited in note 76). See also, for example,
Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1275 & n 152 (cited in note 25) (describing an activity-based
analysis by the First Circuit before it adopted the entity-based approach as “novel and
rather dubious” because “Eleventh Amendment immunity would be qualified rather than
absolute, a distinction that lacks both textual and precedential support”). This criticism
was overstated at the time it was made and is even more erroneous today. Alex Rogers’s
only support consists of a Ninth Circuit opinion rejecting activity-based arm-of-the-state
reasoning, Durning v Citibank, N.A., 950 F2d 1419, 1426 (9th Cir 1991), and a line in
passing by the Supreme Court that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against agencies
“regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman,
465 US 89, 100 (1984). That a defendant may be immune in a suit for damages or injunctive relief hardly determines that the arm-of-the-state inquiry cannot be an activity-specific analysis. Further, subsequent decisions such as Hess and Regents have created openings
for an activity-based approach since the decisions in Durning and Halderman. See
Part I.B. See also Taylor Simpson-Wood, While It May Be True That “the King Can Do No
Wrong,” What about His Offspring?: The Labyrinthine Law of Arm-of-the-State Immunity
126
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advances because it most accurately reflects and protects the sovereign immunity concerns that motivated the arm-of-the-state
doctrine in the first place. Indeed, courts adjudicating “arm of the
sentencing judge” immunity recognize that the word “arm” does
not require that an actor always be or not be such a limb.130 Further, the Court’s arm-of-the-state opinions have created openings
to address and clarify the scope of the analysis. The Court should
take this opportunity to endorse an activity-based approach. This
would provide a consistent level of abstraction at which the lower
courts can operate, allowing the Court to more clearly evaluate
the various factors and possibly clarify the significance of each. It
would also ensure that the Eleventh Amendment’s protection applies only to action truly attributable to the state’s influence.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN THE ARM-OF-THE-STATE DOCTRINE
In light of the Court’s general lack of clarity regarding what
factors courts should consider, the circuits have developed their
own various arm-of-the-state tests. Most commentators seeking
to impose more order onto the arm-of-the-state doctrine write
about which considerations should be given more weight, rather
than the level of abstraction at which these considerations should
be evaluated.131 This Comment examines the uncertainty on the
latter point.
The circuit split derives from disagreement on whether an
entity must only have one arm-of-the-state status. Most circuits
assume that entities have only one status. These courts thus apply their arm-of-the-state factors to the entity as a whole rather
than only to the relevant activity. Most commentators agree with
this approach, dismissing out of hand the possibility that an entity could simultaneously be an arm of the state for some purposes
and not an arm of the state for others.132
Examined through the Prism of Port Authorities, 5 SC J Intl L & Bus 153, 164 (2009)
(describing the Supreme Court as “blazing a jurisprudential path that can only be characterized as divisive”); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 Harv L Rev 1559, 1564 (2002) (noting that “[t]hese decisions have generated
an outcry in the academy”).
130 See Walrath v United States, 35 F3d 277, 281–82 (7th Cir 1994) (providing an
overview of circuits’ general agreement that absolute immunity is appropriate when an
“official’s responsibilities are closely analogous to the adjudicative functions of a judge, or
are ‘intimately associated’ with the judicial process itself”).
131 See note 113.
132 See, for example, Needle, Note, 6 Rev Litig at 212 (cited in note 77) (dismissing
the possibility that “an essentially non-‘arm of the State’ entity may in some of its activities qualify as an ‘arm of the State’”); Bilsborrow, Comment, 64 Emory L J at 826 (cited in
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This Comment refers to this more common conception as
“entity-based” thinking. A holding under the entity-based approach is problematically broad. Barring a change in the state law
makeup of an entity, the entity-based approach predetermines
the arm-of-the-state status for every future suit concerning the
defendant.
Meanwhile, this Comment’s proposed approach is “activitybased.” This approach considers arm-of-the-state test factors only
as they apply to the activity at issue.133 It results in much narrower holdings, such as the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that a local
sheriff is an arm of the state solely “with respect to feeding inmates.”134 These narrow holdings better reflect the intricate
power allocations between state and local entities in modern
government.
A.

The Entity-Based Approach

The abstract, entity-based approach is much more common
among the circuits than the activity-based approach. This Section
uses the DC and First Circuits to illustrate the broad themes of
the entity-based side of the circuit split.135 It then discusses the
inherent tension between the entity-based approach and the
money judgment factor in particular, which further illustrates
how this approach cannot achieve the motivating purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment in the modern age.

note 76) (calling such a duality a “contradiction”); Farr v Chesney, 441 F Supp 127, 131
(MD Pa 1977) (“[T]he Court is not convinced that a particular agency can be both statewide
and local in nature so that only a portion of its activities are protected by the Eleventh
Amendment.”).
133 For circuits not currently employing an activity-based approach, this Comment
recommends adopting the municipal liability doctrine’s method for defining the activity at
issue. See Part III.
134 Lake v Skelton, 840 F3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir 2016).
135 For examples of other circuits’ entity-based approaches, see Gorton v Gettel, 554
F3d 60, 62 (2d Cir 2009); Karns v Shanahan, 879 F3d 504, 513 (3d Cir 2018); United States
v Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, 745 F3d 131, 136–38 (4th Cir 2014);
United States v University of Texas Health Science Center–Houston, 544 Fed Appx 490,
494–95 (5th Cir 2013); Kreipke v Wayne State University, 807 F3d 768, 774–75 (6th Cir
2015); Parker v Franklin County Community School Corp, 667 F3d 910, 926–29 (7th Cir
2012); Public School Retirement System of Missouri v State Street Bank & Trust Co, 640
F3d 821, 827, 830 (8th Cir 2011) (stating that “[c]ourts generally assess an entity’s independence in comparison to the type of independence that a political subdivision possesses,”
and that the monetary judgment question “is one of ‘potential’ benefit [to the State], however; whether a money judgment in this particular case will actually benefit [the State’s]
treasury is not the relevant inquiry”) (emphasis added); Colby v Herrick, 849 F3d 1273,
1276–77 (10th Cir 2017).
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Each circuit structures its own test with different factors, assigned weights, and rationales. Despite these differences, all entitybased circuits share the notion that an arm-of-the-state status
must be evaluated in the abstract and apply to all of the entity’s
various activities. The DC Circuit explains the entity-based approach succinctly:
The status of an entity does not change from one case to the
next based on the nature of the suit, the State’s financial responsibility in one case as compared to another, or other variable factors. Rather, once an entity is determined to be an
arm of the State under the [DC Circuit’s] three-factor test,
that conclusion applies unless and until there are relevant
changes in the state law governing the entity.136
The DC Circuit evaluates how the state characterizes the entity’s functions generally.137 Citing both Hess and Lake Country,
the DC Circuit has characterized the question as “whether [the
entity] performs functions typically performed by state governments, as opposed to functions ordinarily performed by local governments or non-governmental entities.”138 In Puerto Rico Ports
Authority v Federal Maritime Commission,139 the circuit court reviewed the Federal Maritime Commission’s determination that
the Ports Authority was not an arm of Puerto Rico and thus not
entitled to sovereign immunity in an action brought by terminal
operators alleging violations of the Shipping Act of 1984.140 The
court concluded that while the various functions performed were
“not readily classified as typically state” functions, the state’s enabling act for the entity had a state-wide purpose.141 This act, it
explained, “point[ed] in the direction of arm-of-the-[state] status.”142
The above analysis shows that the DC Circuit employs an abstract, entity-based test, focusing on the cumulative characterization of all of an entity’s legal purposes. Like the Hess Court, the
DC Circuit does not clarify what percentage of an entity’s activities must be state-related, or how important a state-dictated activity must be, for the entity to qualify as an arm of the state. And
136 Puerto Rico Ports Authority v Federal Maritime Commission, 531 F3d 868, 873
(DC Cir 2008).
137 Id at 875.
138 Id.
139 531 F3d 868 (DC Cir 2008).
140 Id at 870–71.
141 Id at 875, quoting Hess, 513 US at 45.
142 Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 531 F3d at 876.
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unlike Lake Country, the DC Circuit seems unconcerned with
identifying a “primary” function or activity that gave rise to the
entity’s being.143
Meanwhile, the First Circuit employs another test that operates at the same broad level of abstraction. Its two-step arm-ofthe-state test asks only how the state has structured the entity
and then, “[i]f the structural indicators point in different directions,” about the impact on the state’s treasury.144 In Fresenius
Medical Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc v Puerto Rico and the
Caribbean Cardiovascular Center Corp,145 the First Circuit considered whether a public corporation hospital was an arm of the
state in a breach of contract action.146 It evaluated Puerto Rico’s
constitution, the entity’s enabling legislation and mission, and
the entity’s general work.147 It concluded that the entity competes
with “[a] mosaic of medical providers . . . and nothing about [it]
marks it as serving a uniquely governmental function.”148 Again,
this illustrates an abstract evaluation of the entity’s cumulative
functions and defining legal language, not an evaluation focusing
on the legal language defining the relevant activity or facts. The
court also noted that there is “a fair degree of control” exerted by
the state over some areas of the entity’s activity, such as periodic
audits, annual report requirements, and occasional gubernatorial
intervention on management and personnel issues.149 The court
did not mention which activities were at issue in either its discussion of the entity’s general activities or its discussion of the state’s
relative levels of control. It merely mentioned the facts cursorily
in the beginning of its opinion.150 Instead, it kept its analysis
broad—applicable to the entity’s entire span of possible actions
and detached from the facts.

143

Lake Country, 440 US at 402.
Fresenius Medical Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc v Puerto Rico and the
Caribbean Cardiovascular Center Corp, 322 F3d 56, 65 (1st Cir 2003).
145 322 F3d 56 (1st Cir 2003). Notably, this opinion declared a new test, getting rid of
a prior approach that allowed “sovereign immunity [to] var[y] from case to case, depending
on the entity’s function at issue.” Orocovis Petroleum Corp v Puerto Rico Ports Authority,
2010 WL 3981665, *1 (D Puerto Rico).
146 Fresenius, 322 F3d at 59.
147 Id at 68–75.
148 Id at 71.
149 Id.
150 Fresenius, 322 F3d at 59 (noting that plaintiff’s claim was for breach of contract
and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). For a similarly broad application of the control factor in the entity-based approach, see Karns, 879 F3d at 518.
144
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The Activity-Based Approach

The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit that applies a consistent activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine in all contexts.151
Like the other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has its own factors:
it first determines “the particular function in which the defendant
was engaged when taking the actions” giving rise to the suit (what
this Comment calls the activity hinge); and secondly determines
“whether the defendant is an ‘arm of the State’ in his performance
of the function.”152 That second step includes factors such as state
law definitions of the entity, degree of state control, funding
sources, and who would bear any monetary judgment.153 The circuit applies these factors in a way that “evaluate[s] both the [entity’s] governmental structure . . . vis-à-vis the State and the functions in issue.”154
This articulation of the test illustrates how the choice between activity-based and entity-based approaches effectively controls the scope of a court’s application of its other relevant factors.
This choice serves as a hinge for broadening or narrowing the
scope of the total inquiry. For example, in Manders v Lee,155 a
§ 1983 excessive force action against a county and the sheriff in
his official capacity, the Eleventh Circuit appeals court evaluated
its other arm-of-the-state test factors—such as state control,
funding, and impact on the state treasury—solely as they related
to the activity at issue in the case.156 It did not look to the entitywide distribution of these factors.
In Lake v Skelton,157 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its
activity-based approach.158 It first used state law to define the relevant activity as “providing food to inmates.”159 It then used the
Georgia state constitution’s definition of sheriffs as “constitutional officer[s] of the state,” and the state’s direct assignment of
responsibility to feed inmates to sheriffs rather than to other local

151 The Supreme Court has slipped into activity language at least once, without clarifying whether this signaled a change in the doctrine or was merely an oversight. See Northern
Insurance Co, 547 US at 197. See also notes 130–33.
152 Lake, 840 F3d at 1337. See also Pellitteri v Prine, 776 F3d 777, 779 (11th Cir 2015)
(restating the “particular function” scope of the circuit’s inquiry).
153 Lake, 840 F3d at 1337–38.
154 Id.
155 338 F3d 1304 (11th Cir 2003).
156 Id at 1318–28 (applying the various factors to the function giving rise to the suit).
157 840 F3d 1334 (11th Cir 2016).
158 Id at 1337–38.
159 Id at 1339.
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entities, to conclude that Georgia sheriffs were arms of the state
in the context of providing food for inmates.160
The specificity of the activity-based approach allowed the
Lake court to concentrate on the state law provisions relevant to
the activity at issue rather than getting lost in those delineating
other sheriff-related services and obligations. Although the state
law’s definition of the sheriff as a state official would have been
relevant in an entity-based analysis as well, it would have been
considered alongside all other state law provisions and activities
performed by the sheriff’s office. This may well have resulted in
the food provisions being outweighed by other provisions characterizing the office as more local than state in nature. An entitybased court might conclude that the sheriff’s office as a whole is a
“local” office and thus withhold sovereign immunity—even
though providing food specifically is a “state” activity. In contrast,
according to an activity-specific approach, the sheriff’s state law
characterization mattered only in relation to the function of
providing inmates with food, which the Lake court concluded was
a state activity.161 No other state law provisions or activities were
relevant. As such, the activity-based approach may result in more
specific, tailored, and even different results in arm-of-the-state
inquiries than those of entity-based approaches. The activitybased approach reaches these results because it narrows the
scope of the court’s evaluation of the relevant state law provisions,
levels of state control, and other factors to only consider the entity
activity giving rise to the suit. Thus, adopting an activity-based
approach is akin to adopting a hinge that alters the scope of the
inquiry.
This attention to scope is an advantage over the entity-based
approach, which necessarily results in under- and overinclusive
arm-of-the-state status holdings. If an entity-based approach
were taken with the Lake case, for example, the court would have
considered how much control the state has over the sheriff generally, not with respect to the activity of feeding inmates. Evaluating Georgia law’s treatment of sheriffs broadly, the court possibly
would conclude that the sheriff’s activities as a whole were more
local than state in character. This evaluation would likely lead
the court to conclude that the sheriff is never an arm of the state—
a broad holding that subjects the sheriff to future liability even in

160
161

Id at 1339–42.
Lake, 840 F3d at 1339–42.
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cases in which the state ordered him to act in a certain way. Thus,
the entity-based approach does not adequately align influence or
control with liability. In doing so, it undermines the Eleventh
Amendment’s goals of protecting only state or state-directed
activity.
C.

Instances of Internal Struggle within Entity-Based Circuits
Suggest That the Arm-of-the-State Doctrine Needs an
Activity-Based Update

Occasionally, entity-based circuits briefly illustrate the entitybased arm-of-the-state doctrine’s inability to capture modern
state-local power relationships or do substantive justice. This Section discusses two examples of these instances. The first example,
provided by the Ninth Circuit, shows how entity-based courts can
twist their doctrine to include more activity-specific reasoning
when facing specific types of defendants—in this example, law
enforcement defendants. This may be an effort to do substantive
justice in particularly charged contexts, wherein the defendant
entities elude the entity-based approach’s broad categorizations.
The second example details how entity-based courts struggle with
the monetary judgment factor, a driving impetus for the Eleventh
Amendment, because this factor does not lend itself to entitybased reasoning. These examples suggest that in order to achieve
the Eleventh Amendment’s core motivations today, the doctrine
must adapt to an activity-based model.
1. The Ninth Circuit’s struggle with law enforcement
defendants.
While the Ninth Circuit remains steadfast in its support for
the entity-based version of the doctrine, its lower courts brush
aside aspects of this doctrine in cases that prove especially troublesome. This creates internal inconsistency and weakens the
arm-of-the-state doctrine’s potential to do substantive justice generally, even if it achieves that justice in a particular case.
The Ninth Circuit set out its arm-of-the-state test in Mitchell
v Los Angeles Community College District:162
[1] whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state
funds, [2] whether the entity performs central governmental
functions, [3] whether the entity may sue or be sued,
162

861 F2d 198 (9th Cir 1988).
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[4] whether the entity has the power to take property in its
own name or only the name of the state, and [5] the corporate
status of the entity.163
The circuit evaluates these factors “in light of the way [state] law
treats the governmental agency.”164 The phrasing of these factors
suggests that the Ninth Circuit intended to advance an entitybased arm-of-the-state test. Indeed, the holding in Mitchell itself
was broad and applied to all potential activities performed by the
defendant.165 However, Ninth Circuit courts are quite attentive to
context when dealing with law enforcement defendants.166 The circuit has not clarified the reasons for this minor shift into activitybased thinking. It may be that Ninth Circuit courts felt more compelled to do substantive justice for the plaintiffs within the
charged context of civil rights claims against law enforcement defendants. Whatever the reason, the Ninth Circuit unofficially decided to move away from its entity-based arm-of-the-state approach in the law enforcement context.
In Streit v County of Los Angeles,167 the plaintiffs sought damages for overdetention under § 1983 against the county and the
sheriff’s department.168 In evaluating whether the sheriff’s department was an arm of the state, the circuit court first laid out
the entity-based Mitchell factors and then conducted its analysis
of those factors that were amenable to activity-specific thinking
at an activity-specific level.169 It evaluated whether the monetary
judgment in this particular case would run against the state
treasury and whether the particular activity was a “central government function.”170 The last three Mitchell factors do not lend
163

Id at 201.
Holz v Nenana City Public School District, 347 F3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir 2003),
quoting Belanger v Madera Unified School District, 963 F2d 248, 251 (9th Cir 1992).
165 See Mitchell, 861 F2d at 201 (“We hold that, under California law, the district is a
state entity that possesses eleventh amendment immunity.”).
166 See Roe v County of Lake, 107 F Supp 2d 1146, 1148 (ND Cal 2000) (explaining
that “a sheriff may act for the State and the county in different capacities”); Holz, 347 F3d
at 1181 (reviewing its entity-based circuit precedent as to school districts, which directs
that “school districts in California are arms of the state” and “school districts in Nevada
are not arms of the state”) (emphasis in original).
167 236 F3d 552 (9th Cir 2001).
168 Id at 556.
169 Id at 566–67.
170 Id at 567. Occasionally, Ninth Circuit courts apply the Mitchell monetary judgment factor in a suit-specific way in non-law enforcement contexts, further illustrating the
lack of clarity as to the scope of its inquiry. See Laurie Q. v Contra Costa County, 304 F
Supp 2d 1185, 1202 (ND Cal 2004) (noting that “the state would possess no legal liability
for any money judgment against the County premised on the violations alleged in this
164
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themselves to activity-based thinking. The court conducted an
entity-based analysis and found the “record [ ] bare with respect
to the remaining two factors.”171 After this mixed arm-of-the-state
analysis, the court reached an activity-based conclusion, holding
that the sheriff’s department “is not an arm of the state of
California in its administration of the local county jails.”172 This
is a marked contrast from the circuit’s arm-of-the-state doctrine
jurisprudence regarding other types of entities. When evaluating
the arm-of-the-state status of school districts,173 state-created
commissions,174 or air pollution control districts,175 for example,
Ninth Circuit courts evaluate all of the Mitchell factors, except
occasionally the monetary judgment factor, at the entity-based
level. This contrast in approaches suggests that the Ninth Circuit
recognized the flaws in the entity-based approach and found that
they were too much to bear in the law enforcement civil rights
context.
Since the Ninth Circuit adopted an activity-based arm-of-thestate analysis as to law enforcement defendants, it has progressively reduced the significance of this analysis in this context such
that the municipal liability doctrine effectively controls. The
courts possibly found the internal inconsistencies caused by
maintaining an activity-specific subset within their entity-based
doctrine untenable. For example, in Elfand v Freitas,176 the plaintiff, a formerly incarcerated individual, alleged that county prison
officials violated his First Amendment rights when they refused
to give him certain magazines.177 He requested injunctive relief
and monetary damages.178 The court considered the defendant
sheriff’s claim that “he, other jail staff, and the County of Sonoma
are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”179 It
characterized the claim as an arm-of-the-state claim, citing

action”). But see Holz, 347 F3d at 1182–85 (evaluating in a partly entity-based way the
funding structure of Alaska public schools).
171 Streit, 235 F3d at 567.
172 Id.
173 See Holz, 347 F3d at 1181; Savage v Glendale Union High School, District Number
205, Maricopa County, 343 F3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir 2003).
174 See Sornson v Oregon Commission on Children, 887 F Supp 2d 1111, 1119 (D Or
2012) (finding that the defendant performs central government functions in general).
175 See Beentjes v Placer County Air Pollution Control District, 397 F3d 775, 782–84
(9th Cir 2005) (evaluating the central government function factor in general).
176 2012 WL 850737 (ND Cal).
177 Id at *1.
178 Id.
179 Id at *6.
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Mount Healthy and Regents to explain the doctrine and its adherence to state law characterizations.180 However, it then went on to
cite the Ninth Circuit’s definitive case on the municipal liability
doctrine and Streit’s arm-of-the-state analysis in the same breath,
concluding that the defendants were not arms of the state for purposes of this particular action.181
Similarly, in Hurth v County of Los Angeles,182 the court implied that the municipal liability and arm-of-the-state doctrines
apply the same test. The court issued an order for supplemental
briefing “regarding the legal status” of the sheriff’s department
“under California law,” in response to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss the sheriff’s department from the suit.183 It wrote that the
“true question . . . is whether the Sheriff’s Department is a subdivision of the state” or “of the municipality.”184 It discussed arm-ofthe-state and municipal liability precedents alongside each other
without drawing any distinction between the two and concluded
that further briefing on state law characterization would answer
its stated question.185 After taking it under consideration, the
court rejected the motion to dismiss on the ground that according
to Ninth Circuit precedent, “a California county sheriff is a municipal, not state, actor when engaged in law enforcement functions such as investigating crime (which is the function at issue
in the present case).”186 In coming to this conclusion, the court cited
only municipal liability doctrine precedents, further demonstrating the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s gradual irrelevance in the
Ninth Circuit law enforcement context. Perhaps responding to
this trend, law enforcement defendants in the Ninth Circuit tend
to bring municipal liability arguments rather than arm-of-thestate arguments when attempting to avoid litigation.187

180

Elfand, 2012 WL 850737 at *6.
Id, citing Brewster v Shasta County, 275 F3d 803, 805–06 (9th Cir 2001) and Streit,
236 F3d at 567.
182 2009 WL 10699013 (CD Cal).
183 Id at *3. See also id at *1.
184 Id at *2 (emphasis in original).
185 Id at *2–3.
186 Hurth v County of Los Angeles, 2009 WL 10696491, *3 (CD Cal) (order denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss).
187 See Prescott v County of Stanislaus, 2010 WL 3783950, *3 (ED Cal); Armstrong v
Siskiyou County Sheriff’s Department, 2008 WL 686888, *5–7 (ED Cal). Even cases that
have cited Streit only cited to its discussion of municipal liability. See Payne v County of
Calaveras, 2018 WL 6593347, *3 (ED Cal); Brass v County of Los Angeles, 328 F3d 1192,
1195 (9th Cir 2003); Kei Wei Lei v City of Oakland, 2018 WL 7247172, *2 (ND Cal).
181
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***
In short, the example discussed above shows an entity-based
arm-of-the-state circuit struggling to reconcile the different
scopes of the various immunity doctrines, as well as these doctrines’ different purposes. Notably, the circuit decided it would be
easier to just not mention the arm-of-the-state doctrine in particularly challenging contexts—those involving officials or entities
that perform a fair number of both state and local activities—
rather than face the question of the entity-based approach’s capacity head on. This end result suggests that while the entitybased arm-of-the-state approach is more popular, its internal coherence and ability to achieve Eleventh Amendment objectives
are suspect.
Despite this reluctance to challenge the status quo, courts do
not need to feel constrained by potentially overbroad entity-based
holdings. These holdings, and entity-based courts’ efforts to reduce the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s relevance in challenging contexts, are leading the doctrine’s slow descent into incoherence.
Circuits can deploy the arm-of-the-state doctrine in an activityspecific way, ensuring that local entities bear the liabilities for
truly local activities but not for state-mandated activities. While
other immunity doctrines could just step in and achieve this result—as the Ninth Circuit’s evolution in the law enforcement context demonstrates—adapting the arm-of-the-state doctrine so
that it can function in the modern world is a worthy goal. Entitybased courts seem to dislike acknowledging what would be logically consistent outcomes according to their entity-based arm-ofthe-state reasoning: that an official might act for the state or the
locality while never being an arm of the state (or while always
being an arm of the state). This aversion risks both doctrinal inconsistency and a lack of judicial attention to federalism principles. An activity-based arm-of-the-state test would ensure that
the Eleventh Amendment’s particular constitutional objectives
continue to get the attention they deserve by forcing courts to formally consider the state interests that bear on local action. As
states continue to narrowly but forcefully direct predominantly
local entities such as police departments, it is crucial that courts
apply the arm-of-the-state doctrine with a scalpel rather than a
hammer.188
188 For example, California’s “Sanctuary City” law explicitly removes local law enforcement officials’ discretion in the immigration enforcement context. See Cal Govt Code
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2. The revelatory struggle to reconcile entity-based
reasoning with the Eleventh Amendment’s foundational
monetary judgment factor.
The monetary judgment factor is included, under varying
names, within every arm-of-the-state test. Courts give this factor
particular weight when applying the doctrine because it reflects
one of the Eleventh Amendment’s motivating concerns.189 Its significance makes the entity-based circuits’ struggle with how to fit
it into their tests particularly revealing. These struggles bolster
the constitutional and purposivist arguments for shifting to an
activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine, which would better
achieve the Eleventh Amendment’s goal of protecting the state
purse.
While most of the factors in the various entity-based circuit
tests emphasize the entity’s status generally, these tests occasionally consider the monetary judgment factor with respect to the
facts of the case—that is, asking whether this particular judgment would run against the state treasury. The Supreme Court
has provided little clarity on what monetary features matter, and
the entity-based circuits struggle to reconcile the Court’s attention to the monetary impact of a given suit with the notion that
they should focus on the entity’s broad characteristics. A survey
of the entity-based circuits reveals strained efforts to make sense
of the Court’s unclear guidance while still imposing entity-based
formalities on the doctrine. For example, the Fifth Circuit treats
this “most important” factor, which it terms “the source of the entity’s funding,” as a “two-part inquiry.”190 It first considers “the
state’s liability for any judgment” against the defendants at issue
and then considers the state’s “liability for [the entity’s] general

§§ 7284, 7284.6(a)(2)–(6), 7282.5(a). An activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine would recognize that California law enforcement entities operate as arms of the state in this context,
entitling them to sovereign immunity for suits arising from immigration enforcement actions, while not necessarily shielding them from suits arising from their other activities.
Meanwhile, an entity-based approach would place enormous pressure on the arm-of-thestate inquiry in this immigration context because the holding would control the entity’s
arm-of-the-state status in every other suit, regardless of state control over the activity.
Any conclusion would be both under- and overinclusive in its shielding of the entity. See
also generally Arizona v United States, 567 US 387 (2012) (challenging SB 1070, an Arizona
bill that required police officers to make warrantless arrests when they had probable cause
to believe that the arrestee was an undocumented immigrant).
189 See Parts I.A.1, I.B.
190 Cozzo v Tangipahoa Parish Council—President Government, 279 F3d 273, 282
(5th Cir 2002).
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debts and obligations.”191 Thus, this entity-based test incorporates
entity-based and activity-based analyses into this single factor,
attempting to fulfill the Eleventh Amendment’s motivating monetary judgment purpose while staying true to the circuit’s entitybased reasoning.
Other entity-based circuits treat the monetary judgment factor as a wholly activity-based inquiry alongside other purely
entity-based inquiries. For example, in the Fourth Circuit, courts
ask first “whether the state treasury will be liable for the judgment,” and, if it will not be, they then “consider other factors.”192
And still another circuit attempts to meld the fact-specific and
abstract inquiries into one: the Eighth Circuit writes that a
“State’s role in financing an entity’s operation can indicate
whether a money judgment in favor of the entity may benefit the
State’s treasury.”193 This circuit, invoking the Supreme Court’s
language in Regents that “it is the entity’s potential legal liability
. . . that is relevant,”194 phrased the monetary question as “one of
‘potential’ benefit [ ]; whether a money judgment in this particular case will actually benefit the [state treasury] is not the relevant inquiry.”195
In entity-based circuit opinions, then, there is clear tension
between the fact that the state may only pay for certain judgments against an entity or an official and these courts’ view that
an arm-of-the-state status is supposed to remain constant across
all of an entity’s activities. The discussion in one Fourth Circuit
opinion is particularly revealing. In Gray v Laws,196 a former sanitarian for the county health department sued the department, the
county, and individuals after being fired.197 The lower court dismissed claims against the individuals in their official capacities
on the ground that “in making employment decisions,” they “act
on behalf of the state rather than the county” and thus receive
Eleventh Amendment immunity.198 The appeals court admitted
that “[i]t is often difficult to determine whether a government entity with both state and local characteristics constitutes an ‘arm
191

Id.
Cromer v Brown, 88 F3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir 1996) .
193 Public School Retirement System of Missouri v State Street Bank & Trust Co, 640
F3d 821, 830 (8th Cir 2011).
194 Regents, 519 US at 431.
195 Public School Retirement System of Missouri, 640 F3d at 830.
196 51 F3d 426 (4th Cir 1995).
197 Id at 429–30.
198 Id at 430.
192
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of the state’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes.”199 However, it
would not budge on its rhetorical commitment to the entity-based
inquiry, even as it announced a test that included an activityspecific question regarding the monetary judgment.200 Most pointedly, it remarked that the district court had “mistakenly assumed” that the Eleventh Amendment inquiry is “functional” because “the same individual is not always a state employee or
always a county employee.”201 It attempted to clarify:
While it is true that whether a judgment against an official
is payable from the state treasury on occasion may depend
upon the function being performed by the official . . . , the primary consideration of Eleventh Amendment immunity is
whether the state is liable for the judgment against the employee, not the function performed by the employee.202
This, of course, does not clarify how the Eleventh Amendment inquiry cannot be essentially “functional” as the district court
claimed, because the function performed may determine whether
the state is liable. These rhetorical efforts show a circuit straining
to interpret Supreme Court precedent as justifying reducing the
activity’s role in the monetary judgment question, even as the motivating purposes of the Eleventh Amendment counsel a contrary
conclusion.
In sum, these entity-based courts have struggled to achieve
one of the Eleventh Amendment’s core purposes—protecting the
state treasury—when various state and local purses face potential liability for entity action. By attempting to attribute entitybased reasoning to Supreme Court precedents, these courts reveal that reasoning’s inadequacy. In fact, the openings created in
those precedents,203 combined with the modern fact of intricate
state-local relationships and payment arrangements, provide
forceful reasons for adopting an activity-based arm-of-the-state
doctrine.

199
200
201
202
203

Id at 431.
Gray, 51 F3d at 433–34.
Id at 435 (quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See Part I.C.
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III. REUNITING THE CIRCUITS AT AN ACTIVITY-SPECIFIC LEVEL:
HOW IT CAN BE DONE
The activity-based approach offers key policy advantages in
terms of aligning liability with power and achieving substantive
justice for plaintiffs and defendants. Part IV will further explain
these more far-reaching rationales. In this Part, however, the focus is on how to achieve an activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine. This Part lays out how the municipal liability doctrine offers a means to achieving an activity-based arm-of-the-state
doctrine by providing a state law-based framework for defining
the relevant activity. This Part then justifies why the municipal
liability doctrine specifically is the best guide for courts making
the proposed adaptation.
A.

How Courts Can Use the Municipal Liability Doctrine to
Achieve an Activity-Based Arm-of-the-State Approach

A simple way to adopt an activity-based approach across circuits is to merely add a “hinge” factor to existing circuit tests that
is inspired by the municipality liability analysis.204 The identification of the relevant activity as defined by state law is the starting point for both the municipal liability doctrine’s analysis and
the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s various, circuit-specific steps. If
a circuit can effectively adopt the municipal liability doctrine’s
activity-defining framework in the form of a new factor within its
existing arm-of-the-state test, then the rest of the existing steps
in various arm-of-the-state tests will apply in a narrow, activityfocused way. The circuit can still conduct its evaluation of the substance of the question—whether the entity is an arm of the state
within that activity—according to its own interpretation of the
Supreme Court’s arm-of-the-state precedents.
The Eleventh Circuit provides an example of one way to incorporate an activity-based element. It has created a two-step
arm-of-the-state test, in which it first “determine[s] the particular
function” at issue and then considers various other factors as they
apply to that function.205 The circuits need not completely follow
204 The substantive analysis and purposes of the municipal liability doctrine are explained in Part I.A.3. This Part focuses on this doctrine’s threshold determination of what
level of abstraction is appropriate for conducting that substantive inquiry. This threshold
process can be incorporated into the arm-of-the-state doctrine to create the activityspecific update proposed in this Comment.
205 Lake, 840 F3d at 1337 (11th Cir 2016). See also Pellitteri v Prine, 776 F3d 777, 779
(11th Cir 2015) (restating the “particular function” scope of the circuit’s inquiry).
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the Eleventh or any other circuit’s test. This Comment’s proposed
activity hinge factor would be added into the existing circuit tests,
determining the scope of the tests’ other factors. This change
would enable inter-circuit movement toward uniformity in the
scope of each arm-of-the-state test while preserving some intracircuit traditions with respect to the precise elements each circuit
considers. For example, there is no need for the First Circuit to
cast off its existing arm-of-the-state test factors and adopt the
Eleventh Circuit’s factors. The inclusion of an activity-defining
hinge factor based on the municipal liability doctrine’s activitybased framework would provide a sufficient change because it
would require the circuit’s other factors to be evaluated in a more
context-specific way. This better achieves the motivating concerns behind the doctrine by ensuring that Eleventh Amendment
immunity only covers activities in which an entity, which may do
many acts largely irrelevant to and beyond the reach of the state,
essentially functions as an arm of the state.
It is possible to achieve a fundamental shift in scope without
mandating a wholesale overhaul of every entity-based arm-of-the
state test. As long as the Supreme Court has yet to clarify the
relative importance of arm-of-the-state test factors, the circuits’
organization of those factors may remain the same. Consider the
DC Circuit. This circuit has a three-part test that does not include
any “function” or “activity” factor. Rather, it looks at “state intent,
state control, and overall effects on the state treasury.”206 Supplementing these elements with a factor that focuses on the activity
involved in the case at hand would anchor the whole inquiry in
the facts of the case. The state control factor would be correspondingly changed in scope to focus on state control with respect to the
activity at issue, not state control over the entity broadly. State
intent, which is the means by which the DC Circuit evaluates
state law characterization of the entity, would similarly be
changed: the factor would now focus on how state law treats the
challenged activity. Adding an activity hinge factor to this circuit’s test—or any other entity-based test—would influence how
the rest of the factors are applied. The activity hinge factor would,
at minimum, limit the scope of the court’s evaluation and thus
narrow the scope of the holding to situations in which the entity
engages in those same activities. This reorientation is key to
creating an arm-of-the-state doctrine that responds to modern

206

Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 531 F3d at 874.
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structures of power between local entities and the states. It would
ensure that when the state sufficiently influences a given activity,
the entity does not face legal liability for following directions it
may not disobey. At the same time, this activity-based approach’s
limited scope means that future plaintiffs’ actions may proceed
against the same entity regarding activities that afford that entity more discretion and local control.
Although this shift in scope would not mandate that the circuits change how they weigh each factor in their tests, it would
accomplish two important tasks for the future of the arm-of-thestate doctrine. First, it would allow the doctrine to do substantive
justice across modern government. The Ninth Circuit, for example, might find that the arm-of-the-state doctrine is appropriate
for law enforcement inquiries after all, and this would allow the
Eleventh Amendment’s federalist concerns to be fully represented
in those cases. While the municipal liability doctrine can do similar work in narrowing the focus of the state-local relationship inquiry, it does not formally and purposefully advance those same
constitutional concerns and thus cannot be a fully adequate replacement for the arm-of-the-state doctrine. Second, adopting a
clearly defined, uniform level of abstraction at which the doctrine
operates will create an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the appropriate weight to give each factor. This is because narrowing the scope of the test to the challenged activity removes any
ambiguity over whether courts should consider control of the entity generally or just control over the activity in question, decisively settling on the latter. Clearly defining the scope would create a collection of lower court opinions operating in the same
framework, allowing the Supreme Court to more effectively evaluate the effects of each factor or test on outcomes. Perhaps if
lower courts more clearly defined the scope of their arm-of-thestate tests, the Supreme Court would be more willing to clarify
which factors should be considered, and how important each factor should be.
B.

Why the Municipal Liability Doctrine Offers the Most
Effective and Feasible Means for Making the Change to
Activity-Based Reasoning

The municipal liability doctrine provides a model for how to
define entity activities using state law. As discussed in Part I.A.3,
under the municipal liability doctrine, states may not be sued under § 1983 as a matter of statutory construction, rather than as a

1644

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86.6:1603

matter of doctrinal immunity. The doctrine defines “the state” for
purposes of the statute according to a narrow, activity-specific
analysis of state law.207 The municipal liability doctrine thus offers an avenue by which the arm-of-the-state doctrine can adopt
the activity-based approach of other immunity doctrines while retaining its special attention to how the state defines its own entities and their actions. This special attention ensures that the
arm-of-the-state doctrine retains the same respect for state sovereignty that animates its original source of authority: the
Eleventh Amendment.
This attention to state law and state sovereignty makes the
municipal liability doctrine a thematically superior choice for the
transition to an activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine than the
other immunity doctrines. Even though the other doctrines also
occupy the activity-specific level of abstraction, their analyses do
not offer any real guidance for the arm-of-the-state doctrine given
its particular constitutional purposes. Other immunity doctrines
have developed according to common law reasoning, shifting as
defendants convince the Court that their activities fit within the
objectives of ensuring efficient government while maintaining
sufficient plaintiff redress.208 Meanwhile, the arm-of-the-state
doctrine uses state law definitions to determine an entity’s status,
which is arguably an effort by federal courts to show proper respect for the states when deciding sovereign immunity questions.
The arm-of-the-state doctrine also has remained loyal to the Eleventh Amendment’s motivating concerns of protecting state dignity and financial solvency; the Court is generally unmoved by
policy arguments that, for example, some local entities should be
immune from suit for the sake of efficient government.209 Thus,
the absolute immunity doctrines provide no applicable guidance
on how to define the relevant activity. The municipal liability doctrine is the best, and indeed the only, candidate for this purpose.
207

See McMillian, 520 US at 795:

[W]hile it might be easier to decide cases arising under § 1983 and Monell if we
insisted on a uniform, national characterization for all sheriffs, such a blunderbuss approach would ignore a crucial axiom of our government: the States have
wide authority to set up their state and local governments as they wish.
208 See, for example, Burns v Reed, 500 US 478, 485 (1991) (explaining that “commonlaw immunity [of prosecutors, judges, and grand jurors in certain activities] was viewed
as necessary to protect the judicial process”).
209 See, for example, Hess, 513 US at 47 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment’s
“twin reasons for being” are state dignity and financial liability, and using state law in its
evaluation).
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As illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the municipal liability doctrine shares essential elements with an activitybased arm-of-the-state test. As a threshold matter, both use state
law to identify a relevant activity, and then, substantively, both
evaluate the state-local relationship only within the context of
that activity. Because all of the federal courts are familiar with
the municipal liability doctrine’s threshold determination of the
activity at issue, shifting to an activity-based arm-of-the-state
doctrine would merely impose a framework they are already familiar with.210
Further, the courts’ application of the municipal liability doctrine has been largely successful in terms of predictability and
deterrent effect on entity and officer behavior.211 Of course, commentators have suggestions on how to refine the municipal liability doctrine to better achieve certain objectives,212 but this doctrine’s flaws seem salutary when compared to the issues in the

210 See McMillian, 520 US at 785 (“[T]he question is not whether Sheriff Tate acts for
Alabama or Monroe County in some categorical, ‘all or nothing’ manner. . . . [We] ask
whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.”).
211 See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect
of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 Ga L Rev 845, 862–64 (2001) (“Holding the municipality itself liable for injuries caused by its own unconstitutional policies and customs makes
it more difficult to take refuge in the ‘bad apply theory’ and more likely that the municipality will take steps to remedy the broader problems.”); G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View
of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DePaul L Rev
747, 748 (1999) (arguing that in addition to helping plaintiffs reach the “municipal deep
pocket,” municipal liability claims “facilitate the development of systemic evidence of deliberate indifference to police brutality”); Matthew J. Cron, et al, Municipal Liability:
Strategies, Critiques, and a Pathway toward Effective Enforcement of Civil Rights, 91 Denver
U L Rev 583, 606, 606–07 nn 171–73 (2014) (“For many plaintiffs, the potential of preventing future civil rights violations is significantly more important than receiving monetary
compensation for their own injuries. To that end, many plaintiffs request (and receive)
injunctive relief in municipal liability cases that may have no direct benefit to an individual plaintiff.”).
212 See, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability under Section 1983: Some
Lessons from Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 Georgetown L J 1753, 1779 (1989)
(arguing that the municipal liability doctrine’s “official policy” requirement “encourages
courts to ask the wrong questions” and recommending a focus on private tort law concepts
that establish “responsibility for the injury”); Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116
Colum L Rev 409, 478 (2016) (arguing that because “immunities for governmental agents
and immunities for local entities often work in tandem to block constitutional accountability,” the municipal liability doctrine “should take this synergy into account”); Cron, et
al, 91 Denver U L Rev at 604 (cited in note 211) (arguing that “courts have been hypervigilant about protecting municipalities” and that their “high standards have resulted in
a scarcity of successful municipal liability claims in the federal courts”). While those writers focus on repairing the doctrine, still some commentators would get rid of the doctrine
entirely. See John C. Jeffries Jr, The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 Va L Rev
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arm-of-the-state doctrine as currently conceived.213 And as a practical matter, municipal liability is here to stay: “[I]t [is] neardelusionary to expect the Court to revisit its municipal liability
jurisprudence.”214 Importing just the threshold inquiry of the municipal liability doctrine is thus a feasible task. By adopting the
municipal liability doctrine’s approach to defining a narrow, state
law–responsive scope, the arm-of-the-state doctrine can become
uniform at least in regard to its level of abstraction.
IV. REUNITING THE CIRCUITS AT AN ACTIVITY-SPECIFIC LEVEL:
WHY IT SHOULD BE DONE
This Part offers a brief explanation of how an activity-based
arm-of-the-state approach better accomplishes the broad motivations behind sovereign immunity and achieves substantive justice
in the modern world.
A.

Achieving Federalism’s Purposes within Modern
Government

The Eleventh Amendment’s “twin reasons for being,” the protection of state dignity and solvency,215 have become lost in current government’s complicated, hybrid entities. While federalism
scholars attempt to incorporate the growth of local power into
their conceptions of constitutional action and sovereignty analyses,
courts applying the Eleventh Amendment similarly struggle to
identify, let alone protect, “state” action. The arm-of-the-state
doctrine tries and fails to identify factors and relative weights
that, applied to various entity actions, achieve the Amendment’s
motivating purposes in a consistent, predictable way.216 The

207, 249–50 (2013) (recommending a single liability rule for constitutional torts and, accordingly, the elimination of “the small pocket of strict liability created by Monell”).
213 See Simpson-Wood, 5 SC J Intl L & Bus at 153, 163–64 (cited in note 129) (describing the Supreme Court as “blazing a jurisprudential path that can only be characterized
as divisive”); Nelson, 115 Harv L Rev at 1564 & n 17 (2002) (cited in note 129) (noting that
“[t]hese decisions have generated an outcry in the academy”).
214 Avidan Y. Cover, Revisionist Municipal Liability, 52 Ga L Rev 375, 421 (2018)
(noting the Court’s history with the doctrine and “principles of stare decisis, separation of
powers, and . . . federalism,” and arguing that Congress should step in and create a bifurcated municipal liability regime).
215 Hess, 513 US at 47.
216 See Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1247–52 (cited in note 25) (explaining that
the “growth and decentralization of modern state governments have exposed the deficiencies of [the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s] anachronistic approach” and that “courts cannot
make principled distinctions”).
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activity-based approach, by anchoring the existing factors in various circuit tests to the activity at issue, at least recognizes that
the relationship between a state and a local entity can vary across
the latter’s many purposes. This narrower approach leaves less
room for error—less irrelevant, complicated entity activity to get
lost in. It perhaps even allows the courts to conduct the sort of
narrow analysis that earlier justices likely anticipated in creating
the arm-of-the-state doctrine, back when entities carried out only
one or a couple activities.
Local political subdivisions receive their power from the state
itself, meaning that when the state withdraws discretion or local
control from local officials, those local officials are not acting according to their own designs.217 They have no choice but to accept
the grant of power that the state gives them. As such, state legislatures have enormous power over all governmental entities at
their disposal, whether they choose to exercise it or not. This relationship between the state and its local governmental entities
creates the possibility that local entities may be simultaneously
carrying out local policy—acting in a largely autonomous, discretionary way with power granted by the state—while also carrying
out state policy that has been handed down from the capitol.
Whether they focus on local concerns with local perspectives entirely depends on the will of the state government. When the state
hands down its chosen directives, the local entities charged with
fulfilling those directives should be recognized as acting as arms
of the state, for they have no choice in the matter and the state
has removed their ability to exercise locally focused discretion.
The contextual differences between state-mandated action and a
hands-off grant of state power to local actors are stark and should
be legally recognized in the sovereign immunity analysis.
Within the municipal liability doctrine, some circuits already
recognize this distinction. In the Second Circuit, a municipality
can be held liable if it had some discretion under state law in the

217

City of Trenton v New Jersey, 262 US 182, 187 (1923):

[A] municipalit[y] ha[s] no inherent right of self government which is beyond the
legislative control of the State. . . . [It] is merely a department of the State, and
the State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit.
However great or small its sphere of action, it remains the creature of the State
exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will.
See also City of Columbus v Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc, 536 US 424, 428–29
(2002) (“Ordinarily, a political subdivision may exercise whatever portion of state power
the State, under its own constitution and laws, chooses to delegate to the subdivision.”).
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matter and made a “conscious choice” to enforce an unconstitutional state law provision.218 Meanwhile, if state law required municipal enforcement of the unconstitutional provision or there was
a general local policy to enforce all the state’s statutes, the municipality could not be liable under the municipal liability doctrine.219 Thus, this doctrine recognizes that state laws vary in
terms of how much discretion they grant municipalities in certain
matters. This Comment proposes an analogous recognition in the
arm-of-the-state doctrine: in activities in which state statutes
force municipalities to act in a certain way, the municipality
should be recognized as an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity for claims arising out of those actions.
Notably, the activity-based approach would narrow the holding not to the facts themselves, but to something broader: the activity in which defendants engaged.220 This scope is broad enough
that precedent will be useful—it will prevent the inquiry from
getting lost in the facts of what exactly local actors did in response
to state influence. For example, if the local entity ignored the
state’s direction and this disobedient action gave rise to a suit, the
disobedience would not change the fact that the state held great
sway over how the local entity performed that activity. The local
actors in such a case would be entitled to sovereign immunity as
an arm of the state, even though they did not actually follow the
policy they were ordered to follow. Under the entity-based approach, the state’s power over that activity could be irrelevant to
the arm-of-the-state conclusion if the entity strikes the court, according to its various factors, as generally state-aligned or politically distinct.
An outcome that apparently awards a disobedient local entity
with sovereign immunity anyway may seem intuitively unfair.
However, it ensures that the activity-based arm-of-the-state test
retains its kinship with the Eleventh Amendment’s foundational
concerns about state solvency and sovereign dignity. Recognizing
an entity as an arm of the state when the state sufficiently influences local policy, even if this means entitling disobedient entities
to sovereign immunity in those contexts, reinforces the strength
218

See Vives v City of New York, 524 F3d 346, 353 (2d Cir 2008).
Id. See Dina Mishra, Comment, Municipal Interpretation of State Law as “Conscious Choice”: Municipal Liability in State Law Enforcement, 27 Yale L & Pol Rev 249,
249–51 (2008) (explaining the circuit split as to local flexibility’s significance in municipal
liability claims and arguing that municipalities’ interpretations of ambiguous laws should
be included in the inquiry).
220 McMillian, 520 US at 783.
219
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of the state. It empowers the state to enforce its policies through
public pressure or internal changes to the entity in the context it
is deemed to essentially control. In contrast, an arm-of-the-state
doctrine that implicitly recognizes local entity disobedience as legitimate local action when the state has set a contrary policy
would undermine the foundational rule of sovereign immunity.
Such a doctrine suggests that local entities’ powers are not derived from the state after all.
The above analysis demonstrates how the arm-of-the-state
doctrine can achieve the Eleventh Amendment’s motivating federalism purposes if properly altered in scope. Currently, at least
one entity-based circuit attempts to avoid the doctrine’s overbroad outcomes by maneuvering so that the arm-of-the-state doctrine need not apply at all in a given context.221 While at first
glance the idea of simply replacing the arm-of-the-state doctrine
with one of the many other activity-specific, immunity-like doctrines seems appealing, this is an ill-advised, shortsighted solution. It creates doctrinal incoherence within each circuit’s entitybased doctrine and prevents the arm-of-the-state doctrine from
reinforcing its important constitutional purposes within modern
government’s diffuse, varied structure. The other, precisely tailored immunity doctrines are intended to achieve different objectives;222 none can provide a sufficiently complete replacement for
another. Indeed, the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s monetary judgment factor, roundly viewed as the most significant consideration
in the analysis, seems to call for activity-based reasoning.223 To
ensure that the motivating purposes of the Eleventh Amendment
receive their due attention in adjudications involving state-local
relationships, the doctrine tasked with advancing those purposes
must adapt.
B.

Achieving Substantive Justice

Aligning liability with power furthers substantive justice by
accurately influencing potential parties’ behavior in the future.
Entity-based arm-of-the-state doctrines cannot effectively do this.
Consider, for example, some entity-based circuits’ evaluations of
sheriffs. One Fifth Circuit panel applied the circuit’s six-factor

221
222
223

See Part II.C.1.
See Part I.A.
See Part II.C.2.
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arm-of-the-state test to the parish-level office of a Louisiana sheriff and concluded that “a sheriff in Louisiana may not be properly
characterized as an arm of the state.”224 This holding precludes
potential immunity for sheriffs regarding any action at all—
even if the state requires the sheriff to adhere to a certain state
legislature-directed policy.225 This overexposure to liability does
not deter the state from creating and mandating harmful policies
for the sheriff’s department to follow, and it can result in financial
harm for local defendants. On the other side of the entity-based
arm-of-the-state approach’s broad holdings, the Fourth Circuit
applied its arm-of-the-state test to sheriff’s offices and concluded
that South Carolina sheriffs are arms of the state.226 This creates
error in the other direction: plaintiffs are unable to sue South
Carolina sheriffs in their official capacities over entirely locally
dictated policies. Neither of these decisions achieves substantive
justice by creating accurate incentives for behavioral change.
Both the defendant and plaintiff would prefer a more tailored
arm-of-the-state analysis. From the defendant’s perspective,
aligning liability with power is worthwhile because local entities
receiving state directives in specific contexts should not be forced
to pay for those policies’ harms, both as a normative matter and
because there is no effective deterrence mechanism in holding the
wrong entity accountable. From the plaintiff’s perspective, the activity-based approach prevents locally determined policies from
escaping federal adjudication because the entity or office generally has a close relationship with the state. And in policy-based
suits, the sort of suits in which arm-of-the-state defenses would
plausibly arise, a suit against an individual officer will likely fail
to overcome qualified immunity.227 This reality makes suits
against the local entity or office critical to plaintiffs’ chances for
redress. If an entity or office can access the state’s sovereign immunity for every action it undertakes, plaintiffs are further separated from justice.
Burns v Reed228 provides an example of how activity-based
immunity can more accurately align power with liability and thus
achieve better substantive justice in each case. Here, a plaintiff
224 Cozzo v Tangipahoa Parish Council—President Government, 279 F3d 273, 283
(5th Cir 2002), quoting Porche v Saint Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, 67 F Supp 2d 631,
636 (ED La 1999).
225 For examples of such state directives, see note 188.
226 Cromer v Brown, 88 F3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir 1996).
227 See notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
228 500 US 478 (1991).
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brought an action against a state prosecuting attorney for damages under § 1983 because the attorney had “giv[en] legal advice
to the police and [ ] participat[ed] in a probable-cause hearing.”229
The attorney asserted that both activities fell within the scope of
absolute prosecutorial immunity, and he convinced both the district and appeals courts to dismiss the case.230 The Court affirmed
in part and reversed in part, entitling the attorney to absolute
immunity for participating in the probable cause hearing but not
for providing legal advice to police.231 Such a result, limited according to activity, would be impossible under an entity-based
arm-of-the-state test. Adopting an activity-based arm-of-the-state
test across all suits—not just § 1983 claims—would create an
Eleventh Amendment immunity defense that only reaches as far
as necessary to protect sovereign interests. Further, there are no
persuasive reasons why courts must use broad, bright-line rules
in their arm-of-the-state analyses when they capably make factspecific inquiries in cases like Burns for the other immunity
doctrines.232
CONCLUSION
Most circuits evaluate the arm-of-the-state status of an entity
by looking at the entity as a whole, rather than focusing on the
relationship between the entity and the state within the suitrelated activity. This approach does not achieve the purposes of
the Eleventh Amendment itself, nor does it align with the narrower conceptions of immunity seen in other immunity doctrines.
An update is necessary to ensure that the arm-of-the-state doctrine achieves its constitutional purposes when applied to the
complex state-local relationships that characterize modern government. Without that update, entity-based courts will likely continue to minimize the doctrine’s role in an ad hoc manner when
faced with intricate relationships that the entity-based approach
229

Id at 481.
Id at 483.
231 Id at 494 (“Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the
harassment and intimidation associated with litigation. . . . That concern therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct.”).
232 Even in the entity-based arm-of-the-state analysis, courts conduct long, detailed
evaluations of state law in reaching their results. The activity-based test does not demand
more from them; it simply refocuses this effort on the state law provisions relevant to the
activity at issue in the case. See, for example, Fresenius, 322 F3d at 58–65 (taking eight
pages to conduct an entity-based arm-of-the-state analysis).
230
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cannot handle.233 This shortsighted solution creates incoherence
within each circuit’s doctrine and removes the Eleventh
Amendment’s core concerns of state sovereignty and solvency
from the analysis of state-local power situations. Instead, the doctrine should be recuperated so that it functions as effectively as
the other immunity doctrines in achieving its motivating constitutional purposes. To reaffirm those constitutional concerns in
courts’ analyses of modern governmental action, this Comment
provides a means by which circuits can adopt an activity-based
arm-of-the-state approach.
Each circuit should introduce an activity hinge element into
its existing arm-of-the-state test that serves to narrow the scope
of the test’s other factors. The primary virtue of this approach is
that it focuses the court’s eye on the state’s relationship with the
entity within the relevant activity rather than across the entity a
whole. The Eleventh Circuit already employs this activity-based
approach and enjoys a relatively straightforward, internally coherent doctrine.234 Entity-based circuits may adopt this Comment’s proffered approach while staying true to their own individualized tests by using the municipal liability doctrine as a
guide for the proposed activity hinge factor. They need only use
the municipal liability doctrine’s guidance for identifying the relevant activity according to state law. Clarifying the scope of the
arm-of-the-state doctrine also provides an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to conclusively identify what constitutes a proper
arm-of-the-state test.
An activity-based approach would ensure that the arm-ofthe-state doctrine fulfills its intended federalism objectives and
does substantive justice in individual cases. It would anchor the
many circuits’ various tests to the relevant facts and state law
definitions, thus protecting the state’s sovereignty and solvency
while ensuring plaintiffs’ ability to sue local entities over more
locally controlled actions. And it would capture the realities of
modern state-local relationships, assigning liabilities and immunities that align with actual allocations of power.
Currently, entity-based circuits struggle to reconcile entitybased reasoning with complicated state-local relationships. These
struggles—particularly in relation to the doctrine’s foundational
monetary judgment factor and its unavoidable, inherent activity-
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based features—suggest that the activity-based approach is truly
the best way to achieve the Eleventh Amendment’s purposes in
the present day.235 This Comment’s proffered approach would rehabilitate the arm-of-the-state doctrine so that it achieves the
Eleventh Amendment’s motivating purposes while also more effectively working substantive justice in individual cases by aligning power with liability. The arm-of-the-state doctrine would be
capable of handling modern governmental arrangements in a
world in which the relationships between states and local entities
are ever more complex.
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